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WHEN (AND HOW) REGIONS
BECOME PEACEFUL:
EXPLAINING TRANSITIONS
FROM WAR TO PEACE
BENJAMIN MILLER
Introduction
Three important regions have moved from war to peace during the
20th century: South America in the beginning of the century,
Western Europe in the middle while the Middle East has begun
the move toward the end of the century. Not only did these moves
take place in different periods in this century, but they also resulted
in completely different types and levels of peace. How can we best
explain these transitions and variations?
Western Europe moved from a major war-zone to a zone of
peace in the years following World War II. South America started
the move to regional peace, even if not perfectly, much earlier in
the 20th century. However, since the late 1950s Western Europe
has reached a much higher level of peace than South America. A
vigorous peace process began in the Middle East, in contrast, only
in the early 1990s and the peace there is still much more fragile
than in the other regions.
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The objective of this study is to address the following two
puzzles: what best accounts for the transition from war to peace in
different regions in different times? And what is the best explana-
tion of variations in the level of peace which exists in different
regions in a certain period of time like the differences which exist
today in the level of peace among the Middle East, South America
and Western Europe?
With the end of the Cold War, there has been a growing interest
in the question of regional war and peace but war, and as a result
peace, have always been a neighborhood problem.1 Thus, regional
peace is a prerequisite for global peace.2 Despite the commonly
separate treatment in the literature of causes of war and sources of
peace, we can not understand transitions from war to peace with-
out knowing the sources of regional wars and then how different
peace strategies address them. My argument is that the underlying
cause of regional war-propensity is the state-to-nation balance in a
certain region. Accordingly, different peacemaking strategies, derived
from different theoretical approaches, produce different levels of
peace based on their distinctive treatment of the regional manifes-
tations of the state-to-nation problem, notably, territorial and bound-
ary questions.
Yet, the state-to-nation balance in the region conditions the
effectiveness of the different peacemaking strategies. When there is
a state-to-nation imbalance, strategies which focus on changing the
capabilities of the local antagonists can be the most effective. In
regional context, it means those strategies related to the type of
involvement of the great powers, especially hegemony or coopera-
tion, but not competition or disengagement. However, when there
is a relatively high extent of state-to-nation balance, peacemaking
strategies, which focus on changing the intentions of the regional
parties, can be effective. Most notably, there are two types of such
regional strategies: conflict resolution and integration.
I make a distinction between the effects of approaches to peace-
making and the conditions for their success. Different peacemaking
strategies may bring about the transition from war to peace, but
each strategy will be successful only if certain distinctive conditions
1. Vasquez (1995); and citations in Miller (1998a), p. 2, fns. 4-6.
2. Kupchan (1998), p. 45 citing also Nye (1971).
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exist in the region. Moreover, different peacemaking strategies
bring about different levels of peace. Thus, even if different strate-
gies may be successful, there will still be dramatic differences in the
level of regional peace which they will produce and, thus, in the
likelihood of a return to a state of war. The effects of all the stra-
tegies are regional, but the conditions for their effectiveness vary
considerably and come from three levels of analysis: the global—
the presence of a great power hegemon or concert (for the strategy
of great power engagement), regional/domestic—the presence of
strong and coherent states (for the strategy of conflict resolution),
and domestic—the presence of liberal democracies (for the integra-
tion option).
The strategies are derived from three major approaches to inter-
national relations: one is globalist/systemic and two are regiona-
lists. The two at the regional level are regional society and regional
community. The peacemaking strategy derived from the regional
society is conflict resolution, while the strategy of integration is
derived from the regional community approach (see figure 1). The
third strategy is at the global level: great power engagement. The
three strategies are derived from the global-regional debate on the
sources of regional war and peace. I will propose a solution to this
debate by differentiating among two levels of regional peace (cold
and warm), and arguing that whereas the global level can bring
about only cold peace, the regional strategies may result in warmer
peace, more specifically, the conflict resolution in normal peace,
while integration in warm peace. The reason that international
strategies can bring only cold peace is related to the context in
which it is the most effective strategy—a state-to-nation imbalance.
Since the international strategy only moderates the manifestations
of this imbalance, but it is unable fully to resolve it, the resulting
peace is only a cold one. The strategies, which focus on changing
the intentions of the actors, can bring about higher levels of war-
mer peace, although only in a context of a state-to-nation balance.
In such a context, they can either directly resolve the outstanding
issues in conflict (the conflict resolution strategy) or transcend
them (the integration strategy).
8 E
WHEN (AND HOW) REGIONS BECOME PEACEFUL
Figure 1
Theoretical Approaches and the peacemaking strategies
derived from them
The Theoretical Approach The Derived Peacemaking Strategy
Global System Great Power Regional Engagement
Regional Society Regional Conflict Resolution
Regional Communit Regional Integration
Each of the strategies will be successful in bringing about its
expected level of peace only under certain specific conditions (see
figure 2). In the absence of these conditions, the strategy will fail
to generate such a level of peace. The global strategy of great
power engagement will result in peace only if a great power hege-
mon or concert are present vis-a-vis the region in question. In
contrast, great power competition will disrupt the ability to pro-
duce even a cold peace, while a disengagement from hegemony/
concert undermines the cold peace. The conditions for the success
of the two regional strategies are distinguished based on the debate
on democratization vs. strengthening the state as the prerequisite
for generating regional peace and security. Regional conflict reso-
lution can be effective in bringing about normal peace only if the
regional states are strong and coherent. Regional integration will
be successful in leading to warm peace only if all the regional states
are liberal democracies.
The pacifying value as well as the disadvantages of the three
mechanisms for regional peace will be investigated by comparative
illustrations from four regions, each exemplifying a specific strategy
leading to a transition to a certain level of peace based on the pre-
sence of certain conditions: the Balkans during the 19th century
Concert of Europe (cold peace which collapsed as the great powers
moved from cooperation to competition); the post-Cold War Middle
East (cold peace emerged following the rise of US hegemony
instead of superpower competition); South America during the
20th century (normal peace evolved following the strengthening of
the regional states); and post-1945 Western Europe (warm peace
caused by the combination of US hegemony and successful libe-
ralization). The proposed theoretical framework will integrate the
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regional and international perspectives on regional peace by esta-
blishing linkages between different mechanisms for regional peace
and the emergence of different levels of peace.
Yet, there is a trade-off between the regional and the interna-
tional strategies for advancing regional peace. While the regional/
domestic strategies are more desirable than the international one in
that they are conducive to higher levels of regional peace, they are
less feasible, as problems of nation-to-state are hard to resolve and
liberalization depends on demanding prerequisites. In contrast, the
international strategy is more feasible (to the extent that the neces-
sary international conditions are present), but this mechanism is
unable by itself to go beyond cold peace and produce higher levels
of peace. I will argue that the international strategy can bring
about only a relatively low level of peace (cold peace). But cold
peace can be conducive to a growing effectiveness of the regional/
domestic-level strategies of peacemaking, starting from the regio-
nal conflict resolution strategy resulting in normal peace. Normal
peace, in turn, is conducive to liberalization and as a result to the
emergence of the highest degree of peace—warm peace. The fra-
mework will provide an analytical tool for evaluating the current
and future (short-term and long-term) progress in the Middle East
peace process and in peacemaking in the Balkans in comparison
with past peace processes in other regions, most notably, Western
Europe and South America.
Figure 2
Effects and Conditions
The Regional Effects of Peacemaking Strategies
and the Conditions for their Success
Peacemaking Strategy The Strategy’s Effects- The Conditions for the
The Level of Peace Strategy’s Effectiveness
Great Power Regional Cold Peace The presence of a great power
Engagement hegemon or concert vis-a-vis
the region in question
Regional Conflict Normal Peace Strong and coherent States
Resolution
Regional Integration Warm Peace Liberal democracies
(institutions&common market)
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The Theoretical Sources of Transitions to Peace:
System, Society and Community
The question of the sources of regional war and peace is closely
related to the debate on the relative influence of international/
global versus regional/domestic factors on the evolution of
regional conflict and cooperation.3
The international systemic or “outside-in” logic4 suggests that
it is impossible to understand regional dynamics without focusing
on the broader international context within which regional orders
are embedded and taking into account the influence of external
pressures and incentives working vis-à-vis the region. Indeed, in
the modern interconnected world there can be no wholly self-
contained regions, immune from outside inputs.
Regional or “inside-out” approaches5 claim that small states
respond in the first place to local factors and developments because
this is the most important environment which affects their security
interests. The regional environment creates the most direct
external threats and opportunities for the local states. The regional
argument is that there is a high degree of autonomy of regional
dynamics from international factors and to the extent that the
global arena exercises influence, it is mediated by attributes of the
region such as the degree of intensity of regional disputes and their
characteristics. Analysts of regional security must concentrate on
conflict patterns and processes unique to specific regions rather
than assume that the causes of local conflicts can be attributed to
the machinations of Cold War adversaries or ex-colonial powers or
to the structure of the international system. Regional systems have
their own structures and dynamics, and operate with their own sets
of opportunities and constraints. There are two relevant concep-
tions of regional order: society and community.
3. See Vayrynen (1984); Wriggins (1992); Doran (1992); Hurell (1995);
Zartman and Kremenyuk, eds., (1995); and Katzenstein (1996). For a
useful distinction between “outside-in” and “inside-out” approaches to
regional orders, see Neumann (1994).
4. See, most notably,Waltz (1979). For critiques, see Keohane, ed., (1986);
Buzan, Jones, and Little (1993); and Lebow and Risse-Kappen, eds., (1995).
See also Wayman and Diehl (1994), Brown et al. (1995), and Frankel (1996).
5. Buzan (1991), ch. 5; Ayoob (1995); K. J. Holsti (1996); Job, ed.,
(1992), chs. 1, 2, 3, 8, 10; David (1991).
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Regional society: In a regional society, ideologically diverse
states co-exist, interact and cooperate by respecting the norms of
mutual sovereignty, the territorial integrity of other states in the
region, the sanctity of boundaries, and the principle of non-
interference in their neighbors’ domestic affairs.6 Behavior in
accordance with these norms ensures durable regional peace.
Regional Community: In contrast to the focus of the regional
society-of-states perspective on inter-state relations within a given
region, there is a competing liberal image of a regional community
which highlights the transnational social bonds that link the
individual citizens of regional states.7 In creating a regional liberal
community, this perspective emphasizes the domestic transforma-
tion of the regional states to make them ideologically similar, and
also the enhancement of transnational relations and transborder
communication in the economic, social, and cultural domains. As
opposed to a regional society, in a regional liberal community inter-
state boundaries are not sacred, and inter-governmental relations
are not the only relations that count. Thus, there is a high degree
of involvement and engagement in the domestic affairs of the
other member-states of the community, and a process of creating
powerful supra-national institutions which challenge and diminish
the sovereignty of the existing states.
 A major difference between these two regional perspectives is
that a regional society may emerge regardless of the domestic regimes
and ideologies of the regional states. In contrast, a common ideo-
logy is a necessary condition for the evolution of a regional com-
munity.8 Yet, mere ideological similarity is insufficient for the crea-
tion of a meaningful regional community. Equally important is the
6. On these norms in the context of the post-1945 Third World, see Buchheit
(1978), Jackson and Rosberg (1982), Herbst (1989), Jackson (1990),
and Ayoob (1995, ch. 4). On a regional society of states, see also Buzan
(1991), Job (1992), Wriggins (1992), Hurell (1995), Holm and Sorensen
(1995), Holsti (1996), and Lake and Morgan (1997). For a recent cri-
tique of the regional society thesis which focuses on the domestic poli-
tics of ethnic ties, see Saidman (1997), pp. 721-53.
7. I partly rely here on Bull’s (1977, pp. 25-7) so-called Kantian perspec-
tive, applied to the regional instead of the universal level.
8. See the major work of Deutsch et al. (1957) on security communities.
They argue that the compatiblity of major values is essential for the emer-
gence of such a community. On this point see also Rock (1989), pp. 3-4.
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content of the shared ideology, which should encourage a sense of
affinity (“we-feeling”) and mutual trust among the regional member-
states. Such trust is necessary for giving up part of their sovereignty
by creating supra-national institutions and encouraging transna-
tional relations. As I argue, the major ideology that fosters such
affinity and trust among the states who share it is liberalism, and
therefore such ideology is necessary for the emergence of a regio-
nal community.9
While this debate refers to international vs. regional influences
on regional peace in general terms, I will show that the regional/
domestic perspective subsumes two different regional strategies or
mechanisms for regional peacemaking: regional integration and con-
flict resolution and the different domestic conditions on which
they depend: democratization and strengthening the state. The
debate between these two regional/domestic-level strategies will
be discussed in the following sections. From the international per-
spective one may deduce that the way to promote regional peace
is through great power involvement in the region. But this involve-
ment will make the region more peaceful only when the engage-
ment is in the form of a concert of powers or the stabilizing hege-
mony of a single power. Thus, this study specifies three distinctive
(although not mutually exclusive) roads to regional peace based on
different conditions.
The Theoretical Framework
Differentiation of the Dependent Variable:
The Level of Regional Peace
One of the ways to compare the three mechanisms for regional
peace is with regard to the degree or level of peace they bring
about. For this purpose, I will distinguish among three major ideal
types or levels of peace: cold peace, normal peace and warm peace.
These types constitute three degrees of stability of peace or the
level of the regional security system: cold is the least stable and the
lowest level, warm is the most stable and the highest level of
regional security, and normal is the in-between category. Here I
9. This is closely related to the distinction between “unifying” and “divi-
sive” ideologies discussed below.
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present only a brief version of my three categories.10 The diffe-
rences among these types of peace are summed up in table 1.
Cold peace refers to a situation of an absence of both war and
threats of recourse to force among the regional states. The under-
lying issues of the regional conflict are being moderated and reduced,
but are still far from being fully resolved. Thus, the danger of a
return to the use of force still looms in the background. There may
be formal peace agreements among the parties but the relations are
conducted mainly at the intergovernmental (rather than the trans-
national, nongovernmental) level.
Normal peace is a situation in which the likelihood of war is
lower than in cold peace because most, if not all, of the substantive
issues of the conflict have been resolved. But war is still not com-
pletely out of the question. The relations among the states begin
to develop beyond the intergovernmental level.
Warm peace is a situation in which regional war is unthinkable
in any scenario of international or regional change. Even if some
Cold Peace
mitigated, but not
fully resolved
present
still present
in case of
international or
domestic changes
Normal Peace
resolved
possible
likely in case
of a rise to power
of revisionist elites
in case of domestic
changes
Warm Peace
resolved or
transcended
(rendered irrelevant)
absent
absent
unthinkable in case
of any changes
main issues in
conflict
presence of
significant revisionist
groups
contingency plans
for war
possibility of return
to war
Figure 3
The Ideal Types of Regional Peace
10. For extended presentations and references, see Miller (2000a, 2000b,
forthcoming). There is also no need to do here a comparison with other
typologies of peace because such a comparison is forthcoming in Bar-
Siman-Tov et al. On negative, positive, and stable peace, see Galtung
(1975) and Boulding (1978). On regional security, see Buzan (1991).
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issues are in dispute among the regional states, the use of force is
completely out of the question as an option for addressing them.
This type of peace is characterized by extensive transnational rela-
tions and a high degree of regional interdependence.
The State-to-Nation Imbalance as the Underlying Cause
of Regional War-Propensity
In order to go to war, regional states need both motivation and
capabilities to do so. The state-to-nation imbalance provides an
underlying motivation for war and therefore makes certain regions
more war-prone than others. The state-to-nation balance refers to
the degree of compatibility between the existing division to terri-
torial states and the national aspirations and political identifications
of the people in the region. The balance moves on a continuum
between symmetry and asymmetry. Symmetry means that there is
a compatibility or congruence between the regional states (as enti-
ties or institutions administrating a certain territory) and the natio-
nal sentiments of the peoples in the region (as political aspirations
to live as national communities in their own states).11 In other words,
there is a strong identification of the people in the region with the
existing states and their territorial identities. The result is that the
demand for states and their supply are more or less balanced.
State-to-nation asymmetry prevails when there are nationalist
challenges to the existing state-system in a certain region either
from below the level of the state (i. e., sub-national ethnic groups
aspiring for secession from the state) or from above (i. e., pan-
national movements of unification or irridentist-revisionist claims
to territories held by other states on the grounds of national affilia-
tion of the population or national-historic rights on the territory).
The secessionists claim that there are too few states while the pan-
nationalists argue that there are too many states in the region on
national grounds. The result is that the supply-demand ratio of
states is imbalanced, either the demand considerably exceeds the
supply, leading to wars of secession or the supply far outnumbers
11. On the definition of state and nation, see Connor (1994), pp. 90-117
and Barrington (1997), pp. 712-716. Especially useful is Barringon’s dis-
tinction between state and nation.
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the demand, resulting in wars of national unification.12 Thus, the
state-to-nation ratio is measured by the power of secessionists, irre-
dentists, nationalist-revisionists and pan-national unifiers in a
certain region. Two particular groups who support the revisionist/
nationalist agenda are settlers who reside beyond the state bound-
aries and advocate, with the support of irredentist groups in the
homeland, their annexation to the homeland; and refugees who
claim the right of return to their homes in their previous places of
residence. The more powerful these nationalist forces are in rela-
tion to the status-quo states, the greater the state-to-nation imba-
lance and vice-versa.
Regions with high state-to-nation asymmetry are more prone
to wars than others because of three reasons, which are not elabo-
rated here.13 First, this is due to the emergence of substantive issues
of conflict on national grounds (territories and boundaries and also
demographic issues such as refugees and settlers).14 Second, such a
high asymmetry provides fertile grounds to the enhancement of other
causes of war such as the security dilemma and power rivalries in the
region. Third, such an asymmetry produces regional insecurity
through the effects of spreading transborder instability. For example,
incoherent states produce regional instability because they provide
targets for external intervention either out of temptation for profit
and expansion or due to insecurity and fear of spreading instability
out of the incoherent states. Pan-national forces especially tend to
intervene in domestic affairs of other states, and such intervention
will be most feasible in incoherent states. Ethnic alliances—cases in
which a majority group in one state is a minority group in a neigh-
boring state—increases the likelihood of international conflict
(Moore and Davis 1998) where the co-ethnics in one state (the majo-
rity group) are propelled by feelings of solidarity with their ethnic
kin in a proximate state (the minority). Incoherent states produce
secessionist movements which affect also neighbors’ security.
Because of its weakness, an incoherent state may host, frequently
12. Mayall (1990), Van Evera (1995), Miller (1999c).
13. For an elaborate discussion, see Miller (1999a).
14. For studies which show that ethnic/national claims are major sources of
territorial conflicts, see Mandel (1980); and Carment (1993).
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involuntarily, guerrilla forces which attack neighboring states, or
such state may cause problems of refugees in the region.15
 Thus, addressing this asymmetry may reduce the likelihood of
war in a certain region. How this is done is an important compo-
nent in each of the strategies of peacemaking. Indeed, the state-to-
nation balance provides a coherent way to differentiate among the
three strategies.
Three Strategies for Regional Peacemaking
There are two basic interrelated differences among the three stra-
tegies: whether they focus on capabilities or motivations for war of
the regional states, and how the state-to-nation problem is address-
ed in each of them (see Figure 4).
Figure 4
How the Peacemaking Strategies address the State-to-Nation Problem
Strategy for regional peace Level of regional peace
great power concert or hegemony cold peace: state-to-nation asymmetry
moderated
regional conflict resolution normal peace: state-to-nation asymmetry
resolved
regional integration warm peace: state-to-nation asymmetry
transcended
The international strategy does not resolve the state-to-nation
problem. At best, it moderates the level of the conflict short of
establishing high symmetry. The regional conflict strategy strategy
confronts the nation-to-state question directly and puts it at center
stage by addressing the outstanding territorial and boundaries issues.
The regional integration path transcends the state-to-nation pro-
blem by aiming at a radical change in the ability and motivation of
states to act unilaterally, especially to constrain the resort to force.
 One advantage of the international mechanism is that it can
deal effectively with the capabilities of the regional actors to go to
15. See the useful studies in Lake and Rothchild, eds. (1998), and Carment
and James, eds. (1997).
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war. The regional balance of power depends heavily on external
support, notably arms supply by great powers. As a result, the great
powers can constrain the regional ability to resort to force by impo-
sing limitations on local military capabilities and by constructing an
effective arms control regime. But this can be successful only if a
concert of cooperating powers or a stabilizing hegemon are pre-
sent.
The regional/domestic approaches may address more effecti-
vely the motivations of the actors, either by changing those moti-
vations directly related to the causes of regional wars such as terri-
torial disputes (through the strategy of regional conflict resolution)
or by transcending the causes of such wars through transforming
the general motivations and capacities of the regional actors
regarding peace and war (the strategy of integration).
As a result, the big advantage of the regional/domestic
approaches is that they can establish normal or warm peace, whereas
the international strategy can at best bring about cold peace. Regio-
nal strategies are also less dependent on the continuing engage-
ment of external powers in the region. Yet, the prerequisites for
the success of the regional/domestic strategies are very demanding
and sometimes extremely hard to reach. For the conflict resolution
strategy to be successful, the regional states must be strong and
coherent. The integration strategy can be effective in producing
high-level of peace only if there is liberal compatibility among all
the key regional participants. At the same time, to the extent that
the conducive global conditions exist, the international strategy can
be helpful in advancing peaceful regional settlements under state-
to-nation asymmetry, even if only cold ones. These cold regional
settlements may, in turn, prove conducive to the success of the regio-
nal/domestic strategies for promoting higher levels of regional
peace. (See Figure 5)
This chart is based on three types of variations. The most basic
one refers to the state-to-nation balance: either it is balanced or
imbalanced. When it is imbalanced, the major variation is among
strategies which change capabilities and which are related to diffe-
rent types of great power engagement (worlds 1 and 2). When it
is balanced, the major variation is between two kinds of peace-
making strategies of changing intentions (worlds 3 and 4). This
variation is related to whether the states are democracies or not.
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Worlds 1 and 2 consist of regions in which there is an imba-
lance between nation and state and thus regional conflicts are pre-
valent and there is a danger of war. In these 2 worlds the type of
great power engagement makes a huge difference in contrast to the
lesser difference in worlds 3 and 4. Whereas competition and disen-
gagement aggravate the regional conflict and increase the likelihood
of resort to force, hegemony and cooperation reduce the level of
conflict and produce the conditions for cold peace (world 2). In
contrast to world 2, world 1 is in a cold war situation which is
interrupted occasionally by the eruption of hot wars according to
the decisions of the local parties.16
16. On this world, see Miller (1999a). Since this article focuses on peace-
making strategies, I will not deal here with the regional effects of great
power competition or disengagement. For such a discussion, see Miller
(1999b).
Figure 5
Regional War and Peace: Changing Intentions and Capabilities
The Effects of Changing Intentions and Capabilities on Transition
from War to Peace and on Peace Stability
The State-to-Nation Balance in the Region
Hegemony/
Cooperation
Changing
Capabilities/
GP Engagement
Competition
Disengagement
Imbalanced
2
Cold Peace
(moderated)
1
Hot/Cold Wars
(aggravated)
Balanced
4
Warm Peace
(transcended)
3
Normal Peace
(resolved)
Integration/
Liberalization
Changing
Intentions
Conflict
Resolution
/State-Building
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World 3 and 4 consist of regions in which there is a high
symmetry between the division into states and into nations in the
region, namely, the key national groups identify with their own
states and their territorial identity, and thus the states accept the
current territorial division and the boundaries in the region. This
congruity between nations and states can be translated to high
levels of peace by processes or strategies which change the inten-
tions of the regional players. In world 3 there is a successful reso-
lution of outstanding territorial and boundary questions, leading
to normal peace. There is an agreement among the parties on non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of the other states, respect for
their sovereignty and territorial integrity and on peaceful resolu-
tion of conflicts. However, the lasting success of the conflict reso-
lution process and the maintenance of a stable peace depends on
the presence of coherent states in the region, namely on the success
of the state-building and eventually nation-building in the region.
Under these conditions the incentives to go to war will be much
lower than in a region in which there is state-to-nation asymmetry
and weak states are present. In this case, the type of involvement
of the great powers will be much less crucial than in worlds 1 and
2 and it will make much less of a difference. The more symmetrical
the nation-to-state balance becomes and conflicts are resolved
peacefully by coherent states, the less likely that great power com-
petition will spill over to the region and anyway that it exercise
major impact on regional outcomes. The inability to achieve stra-
tegic gains in the region by meddling in regional conflicts makes
it more likely that the great powers will disengage from strategic
intervention in the region under the conditions of regional conflict
resolution and the presence of coherent states. Under these condi-
tions, it is also less likely that the regional states will need the broke-
rage services offered by the great powers in comparison with worlds
1 and 2.
In world 4 warm peace is reached by successful regional inte-
gration in which there is a voluntary transfer of certain authorities
from the regional states to supra-national authorities and pooling
of sovereignty. A necessary condition for this particularly high level
of peace, in addition to a balanced state-to-nation ratio, is success-
ful democratization and liberalization. But for the initial stages of
such liberalization, which might be destabilizing for the transition
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period, the presence of a hegemon or concert might be necessary
as well, although following the completion of the liberalization pro-
cess, the leadership of the great powers will be much less needed,
if at all, for maintaining the warm peace. A balanced state-to-nation
ratio is necessary for reaching warm peace because in an imbalanced
situation, democratization may lead, at least in the short-run, to
greater instability and ethno-national conflict (Mansfield and Snyder
1996). Yet after the warm peace is stabilized, ethnic conflicts are
less likely to lead to violence, surely not to spreading regional
instability beyond the specific state engaged in the ethnic conflict.
The next sections will present the effects of the different mecha-
nisms on the level of peace and the conditions for their successful
operation.
1. The Global Strategy
The Global Strategy’s Effects > Regional Cold Peace
The great powers are able to stabilize a region, to prevent local
wars and to advance regional peace, albeit a cold one, in regions
vital to the great power interests through the following six inter-
related strategies:17
1. Restrain aggressive local clients intent on wars of expansion
by imposing diplomatic, economic, and if necessary, military
sanctions.
2. Reassure local states and reduce their security dilemmas by
the extension of security guarantees, preferably manifested
in a regional deployment of their troops. Another strategy
that the power(s) may employ to reassure the local states is
leading the efforts to construct regional security and crisis
prevention regimes and confidence-building measures, thus
minimizing the likelihood of inadvertent wars.
3. Deter and contain potential aggressors.
4. Prevent: pursuing preventive diplomacy to forestall resort to
military force or escalation of the use of force.
17. For a much more elaborate discussion of these strategies and the related
references, see Miller (2000a, 2000b).
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5. Mediate and reduce the level of the basic regional conflict
and thus encourage or impose a cold peace. A hegemon or
a concert can help the local states overcome the collective
goods problem by being able and willing to pay dispropor-
tionate costs for achieving regional peace through the pro-
vision of valuable services as a “honest broker”: the great
power(s) can serve as mediator(s) able to employ powerful
pressures and incentives which no other potential mediator
can offer.
6. Guarantee regional arrangements: the powers can guarantee
a regional settlement and serve as final arbiters in case of
disagreements among the parties about its interpretation.
Concerns about the potential reactions of the powers will
motivate the regional parties to adhere to the agreement and
to follow its rules and procedures.
The conditions for the effectiveness of the strategy:
the presence of a Hegemon vis-a-vis the region in question18
The international strategy of great power regional involvement may
lead to regional peace but only if a great power hegemony is
present vis-a-vis the region in question.19 This is based on the logic
of the hegemonic-stability perspective.20 This perspective, drawing
on collective goods theory, suggests that the production of such
“common goods” as peace and stability requires the presence of a
single hegemon that is both able (has dominant capabilities in
important issue-areas) and willing to lead (is ready to offer “side
18. In another paper I addressed also the stabilizing effects of a concert of
great powers and applied them to the 19th century Balkans. See Miller
and Kagan (1997). On a concert see also Kupchan and Kupchan (1991).
For my purpose here the stabilizing effects of a concert and hegemony
are basically similar, but the likelihood of hegemony and its effectiveness
are greater than the likelihood of a lasting and cohesive concert.
19. On hegemony and concert, as well as two other modes of great power
regional involvement, which are not conducive to promoting peace (com-
petition and disengagement), see Miller and Kagan (1997) and Miller
(1999b). On the relationship between these mechanisms and theoretical
realist perspectives, see Miller (1996).
20. For overviews of this perspective and references to key works, see Nye
(1990), Levy (1991), and Miller (1992, 1996, 1997).
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payments” to get other states to join it). The leader sees itself as
a major long-term beneficiary of regional peace, and is also able to
shape and dominate the regional environment. For this purpose,
the hegemon provides a flow of services and benefits to the small
states that include diplomatic “good offices,” “honest brokerage”
or mediation, as well as security guarantees, construction of arms
control and crisis-prevention regimes, and deterrence and compel-
lence of military aggressors. Leadership and mediation by a single
broker should according to this perspective be more efficacious
than that by several great powers, even if they concert their actions,
because transaction and information costs are lower.21 All in all, a
single dominant country will be better able and more willing to
provide these “goods” than a number of comparatively equal powers,
who are more likely to compete among themselves for regional
influence than cooperate to ameliorate regional disputes.
A hegemon is likely to be willing to invest in regional conflict
reduction and to affect a transition from a state of hot or cold war
to cold peace for two major reasons: the intrinsic importance of a
region, and a shared threat. A distinction has to be made between
different regions according to their standing in the great powers’
balance of interests. Intrinsically important regions, whose value
for the great powers stems from major material resources and also
from geographic proximity to the powers, will draw hegemonic
involvement and attempts at stabilization.22
 A major factor which enhances the willingness of the great
power(s) to engage in promoting conflict reduction is the presence
of a shared threat both to the great power(s) and to the status-quo
regional states on the part of an aggressive revisionist power, or
weaker regional states with divisive ideologies.23 The presence of
such a shared threat will motivate the power(s) to invest considerable
21. On these types of costs, see Keohane (1984), and Oye (1986).
22. For the debate on the importance of various regions to the US, see Walt
(1989), Van Evera (1990), David (1992-93), Posen and Ross (1996-97),
Gholz, Press and Sapolsky (1997), and Miller (1998c). For the importance
of different regions to the great powers, see Miller and Kagan (1997).
23. In contrast to a unifying ideology, a divisive ideology does not respect
the autonomy and legitimacy of other like-minded states. Divisive ideo-
logies include communism, hypernationalism, and fascism. Liberal demo-
cracy is the major example of a unifying ideology in the post-1945 era.
See Walt (1987) and Rock (1989).
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resources in forming and leading a countervailing coalition, in deter-
rence and compellence of the aggressor, and also in a more general
brokerage of disputes among the regional states.
Only the presence of a hegemon can make possible the effect-
ive operation of the mentioned-above five interrelated mechanisms.
Such an effective operation will not be possible if the great powers
pursue the alternative strategies of competition or disengagement:
1. Restrain aggressive local clients—Unlike a situation of several
great powers competing for regional influence, in a concert
or hegemonic involvement the small states do not have a
realignment option.24 As a result, the great power(s) need
not worry about losing their clients. The client states, for
their part, have a lesser maneuvering room and are unable
to escape the great power restraining pressure.
2. Reassure regional states: under a concert or hegemony
regional stability is increased by the reduction in the fears
of being attacked on the one hand, and the increase in the
costs that an aggressor is likely to pay by having to face the
great power sanctions on the other. The regional troop
deployment necessary for effective reassurance is possible
under a concert or a hegemony because the powers in either
of these situations face no constraints from rival great
powers and need not fear escalation.
3. Deter and contain potential aggressors—Under a concert
or a hegemony potential regional aggressors do not enjoy
the strategic backing of a rival great power which can neu-
tralize and deter other great powers from intervening. At
the same time, the credibility of the great power commit-
ment to ensure stability in the region is high because of
their large freedom of maneuver in the absence of counter-
vailing great powers. Thus, the great powers should be able
to deter potential regional aggressors and revisionist powers
intent on wars of profit. Moreover, in case of deterrence fai-
lure, the lack of rival great power constraints on their ability
to act militarily should enable the powers to demonstrate
their resolve and compel the aggressor to desist through
24. See Miller and Kagan (1997).
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threats of force and military deployments. If short-of-war
coercive diplomacy also fails, the relatively low constraints
on the great power freedom of action raise the probability
that they will use massive force to maintain the regional
order and rollback aggression.
4. Preventive diplomacy is more effective when there is a
joint action by the great powers or there is a single power
who can exercise moderating pressures on all the regional
parties because the latter depend heavily on these powers.
5. Conflict reduction by mediation: under disengagement,
there will not be a credible broker and guarantor for conflict
reduction or a banker to compensate the regional actors for
their concessions. Under competition the great powers will
obstruct each other’s attempts to stabilize the region and at
least one of the great powers is likely to support a revisio-
nist countervailing coalition which opposes the peace process.
6. Guarantee: the enforcement of the cold peace is more
reliable under a concert or a hegemony. Under disengage-
ment there will be no powerful actor available for enforce-
ment. If the powers compete, it is likely that one or more
of them will support violators of the agreements in the
context of their rivalry with the great power which tries to
enforce the accords.
The main problem with the international mechanism for regio-
nal peace is that it is unable by itself to proceed beyond cold peace.
It is beyond the capabilities of external powers to resolve the
regional state-to-nation problems or induce domestic liberalization,
unless the regional states themselves are willing to undertake these
tasks. Thus, a concert or a hegemony, either benign or coercive,
are unable by themselves to resolve the underlying issues in conflict
and to bring about normal or warm peace in the region. The
presence of revisionist regional states decreases the likelihood that
normal or warm peace will emerge and that the threat of local war
will be completely removed from the long-term agenda of the
region. Concerns about their own domestic legitimacy will lead
authoritarian regimes to obstruct transnational relations among the
regional states, preventing the development of warm peace.
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The cold peace is not expected to survive changes in the great
power regional involvement. Thus, potential problems with the
international mechanism include the powers’ difficulty to sustain
domestic support for a long-term and costly regional engagement
because of public demands to focus on internal affairs. Another
danger is the collapse of the concert or the hegemony due to inter-
national rather than domestic factors. Changes in the global
balance of power, due to a weakening of the hegemon’s power or
a rise in its competitors’ capabilities, may lead to the loss of the
hegemon’s capacity to stabilize the region, because revisionist local
states will be able to receive support from the hegemon’s inter-
national competitors. The expectation of realist balance of power
theory is indeed that any hegemony will be at best temporary
because new great powers will rise or a counter-hegemonic coa-
lition will be formed. According to this theory, long-term hege-
mony is not feasible because of the effective functioning of the
equilibrium mechanism which results in the recurrent formation of
balances of power.25 Balance of power theory also expects great
powers to compete for influence in different regions rather than
cooperate in joint peacemaking efforts.26 As a result, a concert is
also regarded by this theory as, at best, a short-term phenomenon
that is likely to disintegrate into great power rivalry.27 Another
possibility is that in the absence of a hegemonic leadership, the
great powers may act as “free riders,” that is, disengage from peace-
making efforts, rather than attempt to provide the collective good
of regional peace.28 As a result of all these developments, cold regio-
nal peace is likely to collapse and revert back to war.
 To sum up, while the great powers can be helpful in promo-
ting regional conflict reduction, so long as they and not the local
parties play the critical role in the peacemaking process, this pro-
cess will amount to no more than a mitigation or moderation of
the dispute, namely, a cold peace; it would fall short of a full-
25. See Wight (1973), p. 100; Rosecrance (1986), pp. 56-58; Layne (1993),
pp. 5-51. Waltz (1979), ch. 6.
26. On the differences between the balance of power, the concert and the
hegemonic perspectives, see Miller (1992, 1996).
27. See Mearsheimer (1995).
28. On the sources and effects of great power disengagement from regional
conflicts, see Miller and Kagan (1997).
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blown indigenous reconciliation among the local parties. More-
over, the durability of the cold peace depends on the strength and
continued presence of the powers in the region. A collapse of the
concert or the hegemon or their disengagement from the region
may bring about a decline of the cold peace and a return to either
cold or hot war.
 The strength of pan-national revisionism and sub-national/
ethnic forces made the Balkans before World War I and the Middle
East after World War II prone to wars. The difficulties in resolving
the state-to-nation issues in these regions due to the absence of
conducive regional/domestic factors (coherent or liberal states)
made the great powers key players in regional conflict management.
Yet, when the great powers competed, they aggravated the
regional conflicts. Only when the great powers concerted their
actions or a hegemon emerged, regional peace became possible.
This was a cold peace, however, since the great powers were unable
to fully resolve the state-to-nation problems. The pacifying effects
of a concert are illustrated by the case of the Concert of Europe
and the Balkans in the period 1815-1880.29 Stabilizing effects of
a great power hegemon are demonstrated by the cases of Germany
and the Soviet Union in the Balkans.30 I will illustrate the relations
between hegemony and regional cold peace by the case of the US
in the post-1973 Middle East.
The Effects of US Peacemaking in the Middle East >
Transition from a War-Zone to Cold Peace
The post-World War II Middle East was notorious for a multipli-
city of state-to-nation problems, posing tough challenges to the
regional state-system. A number of stateless nations, some of them
spread in a number of states (Kurds, Palestinians and others)
demanded the establishment of their own nation-states. There were
also demands for pan-national unification (most notably Pan-Arab-
ism) or for the abolishment of certain states and the integration of
their land in a different national framework: Israel in an integrated
Arab state or “Greater Palestine,” Lebanon and Jordan as part of
“Greater Syria” or Kuwait as part of “Greater Iraq.” Irredentist
29. See Miller and Kagan (1997).
30. See Miller and Kagan (1997).
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demands were also common both by “Greater Israel” advocates
and by the Arabs vis-a-vis the post-1967 occupied territories (the
West Bank, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights). Such a state-to-
nation asymmetry was an underlying cause of high regional war-
propensity and made the achievement of regional peace very
difficult. Thus, external powers have become essential for moder-
ating the level of the conflict. The great power, most able to play
this role, was the US, which after the 1973 war, and especially the
Gulf War, became the hegemonic power in the region.
The US has employed the various strategies available to a great
power for promoting a transition from a regional war zone to cold
peace:
— restraining its client Israel (notably in times of local wars,
when it posed a threat to Arab capitals, such as at the end
of the 1967 and 1973 wars, or when its use of force could
potentially cause an escalation of the conflict, such as during
the 1956 war and the Gulf War) and applying diplomatic
and economic pressure to induce its moderation in the
regional peace process, for example, during the reassess-
ment crisis of Spring 1975.31 The Ford administration
decided to reassess its policy toward Israel following
Secretary Kissinger’s abortive effort of March 1975 to mediate
an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt. The new
policy included several punitive measures in the form of
implicit threats as well as limited sanctions.32
— reassuring its allies through arms supply and security coopera-
tion and assistance (to Israel, Jordan, the Gulf states and
post-Camp David Egypt), crucial financial assistance (to Israel,
Egypt and Jordan) and security guarantees (to the Gulf
states).
— coercion of revisionist regional powers by sanctions and use
of force:
In contrast to its attitude toward its friends in the region, the
US has imposed economic sanctions and arms embargoes on states
perceived to be hostile towards the US, its regional interests and
31. See Spiegel, (1985), pp. 291-305; and Ben-Zvi (1993), ch. 4.
32. For details, see Ben-Zvi (1993), pp. 97-98.
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the advancement of the peace process, specifically Iraq, Libya, Iran
and Sudan.33 A notable example of a containment strategy toward
revisionist powers by the imposition of diplomatic and economic
sanctions and arms embargo is the Clinton administration’s dual
containment vis-a-vis both Iran and Iraq.34
When diplomatic and economic means seemed to be insuffi-
cient for defending its key interests, the US was willing to resort
to military means to maintain the regional order. Washington exer-
cised deterrence,35 later compellence, and when both of these stra-
tegies failed to prevent aggression, ultimately was willing to fight
and defeat a regional aggressor (Iraq in the Gulf War).36
— preventive diplomacy: whenever there was an acute danger
of resort to force, the US tried to prevent an escalation and
to stop the fighting by exercising moderating pressures on
all the belligerents. This applies to the various clashes bet-
ween Israelis and its Arab neighbors and with the Pales-
tinians in the occupied territories and to the hostilities in
Lebanon over the recent three decades involving Israel, Syria,
Lebanese militias and Palestinians guerrillas (especially until
the 1982 Lebanon War).
— playing an active mediating role in moderating the level of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since 1967 successive US adminis-
trations have undertaken a long series of unilateral diploma-
tic efforts intended to promote the reduction of this con-
flict under exclusive US auspices.37
33. Feldman (1996, p. 35).
34. Hudson (1996, p. 340).
35. On US deterrence policy in the Middle East, see Craig and George
(1995, pp. 186-88).
36. For an analysis, see Herrmann (1994); and Miller (1998c).
37. For a short survey, see Miller (1997, pp. 116-120). Examples include
the diplomatic initiatives made in 1970-71 by the State Department in the
first Nixon administration, dubbed Rogers I, II, III, and IV; Kissinger’s
unilateral, step-by-step “shuttle diplomacy” which produced the disen-
gagement accords of 1974 between Israel and Egypt (Sinai I, January
1974), and between Israel and Syria (May 1974), and the Sinai II interim
accord between Israel and Egypt (September 1975); Carter’s mediation
of the Camp David accords (September 1978) and the Egyptian-Israeli
peace treaty (March 1979); Reagan’s “fresh start” initiative of September
1, 1982; and the diplomatic efforts made by the Bush administration in
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Moreover, the US serves, in fact, as the guarantor of the accords
reached between Israelis and Arabs since 1973 and as a final arbiter/
referee in case of disagreements among the parties about the
interpretation of a settlement. For example, an important component
of the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreements in the Sinai in
the aftermath of the Yom-Kippur war has been the US role in
monitoring and verifying the implementation of the agreements,
including an American commitment to administer early-warning
stations at the buffer zone and to conduct regular reconnaissance
flights over the demilitarized area established by the accord. In the
Camp-David accords the US was active in the establishment and
manning of the international force that was deployed in the Sinai.38
While US involvement has been conducive to the establish-
ment of cold peace in some parts of the Middle East, peacemaking
has not progressed much beyond this level. Thus, the threat of war
has not disappeared completely from the Israeli-Egyptian relations
(despite their having been at peace since 1979), let alone from the
Israeli-Syrian arena, where there are still many unresolved substan-
tive issues related to the recognition of Israel, normalization of
Syrian-Israeli relations, security arrangements, and the legitimacy
of boundaries. Even in the two Arab states who have signed peace
agreements with Israel (Egypt and Jordan), there are still signifi-
cant elites who continue to regard Israel as illegitimate and oppose
the development of transnational relations with it, at least partly
because of the lack, thus far, of a permanent settlement of the
Palestinian problem. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is cur-
rently at the last stage of the implementation of interim agree-
ments, while most of the substantive issues in conflict are still hotly
disputed in the negotiations on the final-status agreement. These
issues include the demand of the Palestinians to exercise the right
of self-determination, the construction of legitimate boundaries
between Israel and the Palestinians, the status of Jerusalem, and
the settlement of the Palestinian refugees. The peace process at its
current stage is still heavily dependent on US diplomatic, economic
the wake of the Gulf War, culminating in the convening of the Madrid
peace conference in October 1991. The Clinton Administration was
very active in trying to mediate peace agreements, in various degrees of
success, between Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan and Syria.
38. See Mandell (1990), Mandell and Tomlin (1991), and Quandt (1993).
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and security support for the Palestinian track and even more so for
the Syrian-Israeli negotiations.
The Conditions for the Effectiveness of the Strategy:
The Rise of US Hegemony in the Middle East
The global Cold War and superpower competition in the Middle
East in the 1948-73 period prolonged the Arab-Israeli conflict and
made it difficult to move beyond a regional cold war to cold peace,
that is, to reduce the level of the regional conflict.39 Thus, the
superpowers had major effects on the persistence and longevity of
the Arab-Israeli conflict; they helped to sustain it by arms supply
and diplomatic and economic support of their respective clients.
What’s more, a strategic backing of their clients by the super-
powers, namely the commitment to come to their aid in times of
crisis by arms resupply and issuing threats of intervention when the
clients were attacked and the survival of their regimes was threatened,
reduced the costs and risks of continuing the conflict for the client
states, including by resort to force.
In the post-1973 period the US gradually managed to exclude
the Soviet Union from involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and
to establish a partial hegemony over the region, becoming the
common great power patron of Israel and Egypt. The US hege-
mony became more complete with the end of the Cold War and
Soviet disintegration,40 when other Arab parties to the conflict,
notably the Palestinians and Syria, lost the possibility of recourse
to a rival superpower patron, who could shield them from the
adverse effects and costs of opposition to US-led peacemaking efforts.
The US has played a leading role in cooling the Arab-Israeli
conflict since the 1973 war. US leadership helped to moderate the
conflict, to initiate an Arab-Israeli peace process, and specifically to
establish a cold peace between Israel and Egypt in 1978-9.41 Follow-
ing the Gulf war, a more comprehensive cold peace was established,
39. For an extended discussion of the argument made in this section, see
Miller (1999b).
40. See Miller (1997); Hudson (1996).
41. See Touval (1982), chs. 9, 10; Telhami (1990); Ben Zvi (1993);
Quandt (1993). On recent developments in this cold Israeli-Egyptian
peace (before the Nethanyahu government assumed office in Israel in
June 1996 and subsequent events made it arctic), see Gerges (1995).
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manifested in the Madrid process involving Israel, the Palestinians,
Jordan and most Arab states.42 It is extremely hard to imagine the
progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process since 1973 without the
active mediation and the financial assistance of the US to Israel and
to the two parties which signed peace treaties with it—Egypt and
Jordan. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of Soviet power,
and the blow inflicted by the US to Iraqi military power, and thus
to Arab radicalism, in the Gulf War changed the strategic landscape
in the region by reinforcing the power of the status-quo players
(Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, the PLO and Israel) at the expense of the
revisionists (notably, Iraq and Iran) and thus made possible the
accomplishments in Arab-Israeli diplomacy in the 1990s. The Gulf
War dramatically demonstrated the security dependence of both
Israelis and most Arab states on US military power.
US economic power also provides it with important leverage
both through direct financial assistance to key regional players and
through the provision of credit and technology transfers. More-
over, the central role played by the US aid makes any peace agree-
ment between Israel and an Arab party an accord between each
party and the US not less than a bilateral Arab-Israeli peace. The
expectation to receive substantial military and economic assistance
from the US was a major motivation for joining the US-led peace
process by Egypt in the late 1970s and Jordan, the Palestinians and
Syria in the 1990s. For Israel, the vast amounts of annual aid from
the US was a crucial compensation for its willingness to concede
peacefully to the Arabs tangible goods—the occupied territories—
as part of a “land for peace” formula. The continuous US econo-
mic aid and its military dependence on the US provides an
important incentive for Egypt to continue to adhere to the peace
process even in the face of what it views as Israeli intransigence.
Similarly, the Israeli economic-diplomatic-military dependence on
the US moderates its policy with regard to both the use of force
and concessions in the peace process.
As for the US willingness to play the role of the hegemon in
the Middle East, it stems from the intrinsic importance of the
region to US interests due to the location of vast oil resources
there. This produces an American interest in maintaining good
42. See Indyk (1992); Quandt (1993); Lieber (1995).
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relations with the Arab states. Such an interest conflicts with the
US political/ideological/moral commitment to Israel’s security.
The US tries to reconcile this conflict of interests by advancing the
Arab-Israeli peace process. US attempts during the Cold War to cons-
truct an Arab-Israeli grand alliance against the supposedly shared
Soviet threat have failed because local parties diverge from great
powers by tending to focus on regional threats rather than on
global ones. In contrast to the highly dubious and disputed Soviet
threat to the regional states, following its 1990 invasion of Kuwait,
Iraqi revisionism has posed a true shared threat to the US (because
of the threat to the regional oil resources), Israel and status-quo
Arab states. Thus, the US was able to lead a multinational coali-
tion, which included most Arab states, and in the aftermath of its
victory over Iraq to promote the Arab-Israeli peace process. As the
US is both democratic and distant from the region, the form of its
hegemony has been benign, with an emphasis on encouraging (rather
than imposing) a regional order and peace.
2. Regional/Domestic Strategies
The Strategy of Regional Conflict Resolution
The resolution of regional state-to-nation problems, especially
their territorial manifestations, reduces the likelihood of wars in the
region quite considerably. But so long as there are incoherent
states in the region, successful conflict resolution is less likely. More-
over, the presence of coherent states in the region is necessary for
the stability of the peace accords and for reaching the level of regio-
nal normal peace for an extended period.
The Effects of Conflict Resolution Normal Peace
This strategy suggests that rather than relying on external powers,
the regional parties should focus on directly addressing the state-
to-nation issues in dispute among them through negotiation and
conflict resolution.43 More specifically, the parties should settle the
43. On negotiations and conflict resolution, see, for example, Mitchell (1981,
pp. 275-7), Patchen (1988), Kriesberg (1992), Hopmann (1994), and
Zartman and Kremenyuk (1995). For an overview and references, see Craig
and George (1995), pp. 163-179.
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substantive manifestations of the state-to-nation issues in dispute,
such as recognize all the other states in the region, agree on
acceptable boundaries, resolve territorial conflicts and problems of
refugees and negotiate a fair division of scarce resources such as
water.
A resolution of these problems will lessen the motivations of
the regional states for going to war, and thus will markedly reduce
the likelihood of the outbreak of wars in the region.44 More
specifically, conflict resolution will make less likely the occurrence
of the three major types of regional wars: security dilemma wars,
profit wars and diversionary wars.45 With regard to security
dilemma (or inadvertent) wars, in accordance with the logic of the
conflict resolution strategy, it is the extent and severity of unresolved
issues that accounts for regional variations in the intensity of the
security dilemma.46 The extent of unresolved problems conditions
the security dilemma and the war-proneness of different regions.
In other words, when there is a high state-to-nation symmetry, and
thus the territorial division among the states is widely accepted, the
intensity of the security dilemma is lower, and it is less likely that
mutual fears of being attacked and preempted will dominate the
relations among the regional states and vice versa.47 Thus, the
security dilemma is unlikely to lead to war among any type of
potential neighbors, but only when there is a high state-to-nation
asymmetry, resulting in sharp territorial disagreements.
Nationalist irredentism provides substantive issues for wars of
profit or expansion, namely, boundaries, territory and struggle for
44. For empirical findings about the connection between resolved territorial
disputes and declining likelihood of war in comparison with unresolved
teritorial conflicts, which are an extremely potent predictor of interstate
war see Kocs (1995). Although these findings make a lot of sense, the
question is whether there are causal relations or only correlations. In
other words, what does explain the variations between resolved and
unresolved conflicts? Moreover, while Kocs focuses on interstate dyads,
I deal with regional war and peace, which is affected also by civil/ethnic
conflicts since these may have transborder regional security effects. In
this context, the state-to-nation balance plays a key role.
45. On these types of wars, see, for example, Stein (1993) and Miller (forth-
coming).
46. On the security dilemma, see Jervis (1978), Buzan (1991), and Miller
(1995), ch. 1.
47. For a partly related argument, see Wendt (1992), and Schweller (1996).
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hegemony. The resolution of these disputes will directly reduce the
likelihood of wars of profit. Diversionary wars, on the other hand,
are produced by problems of domestic illegitimacy, related in many
cases to nation-to-state problems. These wars reflect an aggressive
policy which arises out of domestic political weakness and insecur-
ity of the elite. This is the diversionary or scapegoat theory of
externalizing domestic conflict and instability in order to
strengthen the hold of the ruling elite on power. Nationalist elites,
in particular, are likely to try to rally their ethno-national group
around the flag against another ethnic group.48 Thus, a resolution
of regional disputes will not address this kind of wars directly. Yet,
diversionary wars are also more likely under a state-to-nation
imbalance which leads to sharp boundary and territorial disagree-
ments: it is much easier for an insecure elite in an unstable regime
to initiate war in a region in which there is a low rather than high
level of acceptance of the current borders because such low
acceptance provides ready pretexts for war.
In contrast, the resolution of state-to-nation problems
strengthens local states and increases their domestic stability,
because of the resolution of secessionist problems which may have
posed a major challenge to ruling elites and thus have increased
their insecurity. Thus, mutual recognition and the acceptance of
boundaries strengthen the regional states not only externally but
also internally vis-à-vis their own societies, and increase the stability
of their political regimes. As a result, the likelihood of scapegoat
wars will also be lower if the territorial manifestations of the state-
to-nation asymmetry are resolved.
The Conditions for the Effectiveness of the Conflict Resolution
Strategy: The presence of Strong/Coherent states in the region
Yet, the relationship between stable and strong states and regional
conflict resolution is a complex one. While regional conflict reso-
lution strengthens local states because of the acceptance of their
sovereignty and boundaries by their neighbors, the other side of
the coin is that the effectiveness and durability of conflict reso-
lution is heavily dependent on the prior presence of strong states
in the region. State strength (or coherence) is a different and separate
48. See Levy (1989), Lebow (1981), and Snyder (1991).
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concept from the realist notion of state power or capabilities. It has
three main dimensions: the effectiveness of state institutions; the
level of identification of the citizens with the state; and the firm-
ness of the territorial identity of the state, namely, the extent of
acceptance and permanence of its boundaries in the eyes of its
neighbors and domestic groups.49 The latter two dimensions are
interrelated and also heavily affect the state-to-nation symmetry
and thus the regional war-propensity, because a low level of citizen
identification and a lack of firm territorial identity may result in
attempts at secession and border changes which may spillover and
involve a number of regional states. As a result, these two dimen-
sions are the two most relevant for regional war and peace. In
other words, the weaker the regional states on these two dimen-
sions, the greater the state-to-nation problem, the lesser the regio-
nal and domestic stability and greater the obstacles for effective
conflict resolution; conversely, the stronger the states on these two
dimensions, the greater the likelihood for successful conflict reso-
lution and thus for normal peace.50
Under state-to-nation asymmetry even elites which are interest-
ed in making peace face serious domestic and external constraints
in incoherent and unstable states. Nationalist/ethnic forces oppose
making territorial concessions either on demographic grounds (the
territories are populated by ethnic kin) or due to national-historical-
religious attachments to these territories. Nationalists manipulate
such causes against moderate elites who have limited maneuvering
freedom in incoherent states. Weak states are also vulnerable to
pressures by other states which are able to intervene in their
domestic affairs and can make it difficult to pursue moderate policies.
Under the pressures of secessionist movements it is difficult to
reach stable peace agreements with neighbors who may also face
nationalist and ethnic pressures. Irredentist forces, for their part,
fight against concessions. Ambitious politicians use the nationalist/
ethnic cards in order to promote themselves and thus make it dif-
ficult to pursue moderate policies. Mobilization against external
national/ethnic enemies is a major diversionary tactic in order to
mobilize mass support by political leaders in incoherent states. This
49. See Buzan (1991, ch. 2), Ayoob (1995), Holsti (1996).
50. See Ayoob (1995), pp. 194-6.
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is especially the case in regions populated by states which are
considered illegitimate by some of their neighbors or by peoples
which are not seen as qualified to have their own states (Israel and
the Palestinians, the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and in Iran, Taiwan and
China, South and North Vietnam, South and North Korea, Russia
and Chechnya, etc.). Nation-to-state imbalance produces conflict-
prone regions with deep-seated animosity among neighbors. Such
neighbors with a long history of rivalry have a hard time over-
coming by themselves a legacy of mutual fears and suspicion, and
it will be difficult for them to resolve conflicts without external
support, mediation and assurances and to agree on issues like
boundaries, on which they have incompatible positions. A related
challenge to the conflict resolution strategy is presented by
powerful (although not domestically coherent) irredentist states
which claim to have historical/national/ethnic rights to control
territories belonging to their neighbors. Domestic instability in
these irredentist states due to incoherence produces additional
incentives for externalizing internal conflicts and thus for the use
of force against proximate states which are unable to deter such
aggressors and defend themselves against them.
To overcome these obstacles to regional conflict resolution,
state building is necessary. Thus, the strategy of conflict resolution
may also be called the “statist” strategy, because it gives priority to
strengthening the state and consolidating its power over separatist
groups. This is done by monopolizing the instruments of violence
in the state’s hands (namely, disarming the secessionist groups)
and maintaining its territorial integrity.51 At the minimum the
regional states should be in the process of strengthening their
institutional base for attempts at conflict resolution to be effective.
This strengthening includes maintenance of law and order,
development of bureaucracy, taxation, constitution, and the ability
to provide socio-economic services.52 In order for conflict resolu-
tion to bring about stable peace, the state-building should be
followed by a nation-building process, which, if successful, leads to
identification of the major groups within the state with its existing
territorial identity at the expense of nationalist-revisionist and ethnic-
51. Ayoob (1995, pp. 182-4) and the sources he cites.
52. Weiner (1987), p. 59.
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secessionist forces. Nation-building includes the provision of non-
material symbolic functions to the populations through a national
educational system and myth-making.
Under these conditions, many regional conflicts are more
likely to be resolved and wars are more likely to be prevented. The
greater state coherence makes it more difficult for pan-nationalist
ideologies to penetrate the state and to challenge pragmatic
policies. Coherent states will thus be both more stable internally
and less vulnerable to domestic and transnational pressures to adopt
hard-line positions which make a resort to force more likely and
peaceful resolution of the regional conflicts less feasible. In other
words, coherent states are more likely to endorse pragmatic inter-
national orientations and to behave cautiously according to cost-
benefit (strategic and economic) calculations rather than ideological/
emotional nationalist commitments and sentiments.53 Such senti-
ments and symbols make it more difficult to bargain and to reach
compromises and accommodation than materialist/rationalist
considerations according to which it is frequently more profitable
to negotiate peaceful arrangements rather than going to a costly
war (Fearon 1995). Coherent states are also less hospitable to
guerrilla/terrorist organizations which conduct armed infiltrations
into neighboring states. Because secessionist movements in cohe-
rent states are in decline, these states are also less likely to produce
such guerrilla forces. Coherent states are also less likely to trigger
destabilizing refugee movements across borders, or to invite armed
intervention by neighbors bent on exploiting opportunities for
expansion or worried about security threats from secessionist or
irredentist elements present in unstable neighboring states. In this
sense the formation of coherent states decreases the security
dilemma in the region. It also reduces the motivation of unstable
elites for diversionary wars, as well as the motivation and oppor-
tunity for wars of profit. All these processes reinforce the standing
of status-quo elites who are more able and willing to reach normal
peace based on mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial
integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other
states.
53. This is the idea of “stateness” according to Ben-Dor (1983).
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The problem is that state-building and especially nation-build-
ing are difficult to accomplish in regions with nation-to state
imbalance where many states are weak and lack firm territorial
identity manifested in the presence of national/ethnic minorities
which claim to exercise the right of self-determination, establish
their own states through secession or be annexed to a contiguous
state dominated by their ethnic kin, who, for their part, favor
irredentism.54 This tension is especially severe in the Third World
and the Balkans, due to the artificially-drawn post-colonial bound-
aries of the states and the arbitrary allocation of peoples and terri-
tory to states in these regions.55 Numerous post-colonial states are
either composed of distinct and sometimes hostile ethnic groups, or
previously homogenous ethnic communities are divided between
two or more states. Most regimes in Africa and the Middle East have
faced major domestic legitimacy problems because they preside
over artificial colonial constructs that are very vulnerable to internal
challenges. Thus, most new Third World states have faced problems
of either secession or irredentism soon after independence.56
These problems are highly aggravated by exclusionary policies
of ethnic discrimination and economic exploitation by the domi-
nant ethno-national groups who maintain their exclusive control
over the political and economic systems and the military.57 At the
same time, the possibilities for state-building by internal or extern-
al coercion as well as by economic bribes were constrained by the
economic and military weakness of the central authorities in many
states. Such weakness also produced high economic and security
dependence on the Western powers, which, in turn exerted pres-
sures against violent policies and massive violations of human rights,
thus making it even more difficult to build states through coer-
cion.58
54. See, for example, Diamond and Plattner (1994), p. xv. For a list of all
the claims for self-determination according to the different regions, see
Halperin and Scheffer (1992); For a comprehensive list of ethnopolitical
conflicts in 1993, see Gurr (1994), pp. 160-166.
55. See Ayoob (1995, p. 48); Buzan (1991); Jackson (1990); Job (1992);
Kacowicz (1998); Holsti (1996).
56. Ayoob (1995, pp. 34-35); Buzan (1991); Holsti (1996). On secession
and irredentism, see Carment and James (1997), pp. 194-231.
57. Weiner (1987), pp. 35-36, 40-41.
58. Ayoob (1995).
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The difficulty in state-building poses severe problems for the
conflict resolution strategy: as noted, this strategy depends on strong
states, but under state-to-nation imbalance, state building is dif-
ficult. In other words, state-building is least feasible where it is
most needed.
A possible solution maybe democratization since a democratic
regime can be very helpful for strengthening the state in the long
run, especially the identification of the population with the state
which gives them political rights and reduce ethnic-based discrimi-
nation. Yet, for the short-run, democratization in weak states may
further weaken the state and bring about its disintegration (see
below). For this reason, the conflict resolution/state building stra-
tegy gives priority to consolidating state power over domestic groups
at the expense of, and as a prior prerequisite for, democratization.
Thus, regional integration/liberalization and regional conflict reso-
lution/state building constitute distinct and competing approaches
to regional peacemaking. One possible way to make them com-
plementary is in the framework of an integrated-gradual approach
discussed at the end of the article.
Twentieth-Century South America:
State building > Conflict Resolution > The Evolution
of Normal Regional Peace
The Effects: Conflict Resolution > Transition from War
to Normal Peace
Nineteenth-century South America was an area of chronic war and
armed intervention, for example, the war of Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay against Paraguay in 1865-70 (Lynch 1993, pp. 40-46),
the Pacific war among Chile, Bolivia and Peru (1779-1883), and
armed conflicts over boundaries between Brazil and its southern
neighbors: Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.59 But since 1941
there has been no inter-state war in the region.60 Moreover, as K.
59. Seckinger (1984); Kacowicz (1996), p. 19; D’Agostino (1997), p. 52
and Fraser (1997), p. 158.
60. The two wars during the 20th century were the Chaco war between
Bolivia and Paraguay in 1932-35 and the war between Peru and Ecua-
dor in 1941, although military clashes between the latter pair took place
also in 1981 and 1995.
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J. Holsti (1996, ch. 8) suggests, in the twentieth century this
region has become a no-war zone where mutually peaceful
relations and non-violent modes of conflict resolution are the
norm.61 Except for North America, South America has been the
most peaceful area in the world in the twentieth century. The
region has shown a marked inclination towards conflict settlement
as compared to other regions, for example, by frequently using
arbitrage procedures and subscribing to many multilateral treaties.
No regional state has disappeared or has been born as a result of
violence in the 20th century, and there have been only few minor
territorial changes in the region. Thus, South America as a region
has moved during the 20th century toward normal peace, even if
an incomplete one, as some pairs of states did not reach normal
peace during some periods (Holsti 1996, pp. 158-161). But in a
comparative regional basis, the number of territorial conflicts that
were resolved peacefully in South America remains unique (Kacowicz
1994, pp. 265-94; Kacowicz 1998; Holsti 1996, p. 156).
 Thus, in contrast to the continuous domestic instability in
most countries of the region, regional legitimacy in South America
has been strengthened since the end of the 19th century due to a
process of conflict resolution. The normative basis for the peaceful
settlement of the vast majority of border disputes in the region was
established through the common recognition of the principle of
uti possidetis, according to which the South American states accept-
ed the colonial boundaries as their post-independence international
frontiers.62 The regional states also accepted the norms of the
sovereign equality of states and of nonintervention in the domestic
affairs of sovereign states. The Estrada Doctrine (1930) held that
if a particular government controlled population and territory, it
deserved to be accorded diplomatic recognition and no normative
evaluation or criterion should be applied (Fraser 1997, p. 160).
An especially important factor in the evolution of normal peace
is that the most powerful state in the region, Brazil, has been a
status quo state and has not entertained expansionist aspirations
(Calvert 1969, pp. 39-40).
61. Kacowicz (1998) calls it a zone of “negative peace.”
62. See Child (1985); Ireland (1938); Kacowicz (1998).
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The Necessary Conditions: Growing State Coherence
and State-to-Nation Balance > Less War-Proneness
and More Successful Conflict Resolution
A major explanation for the emergence of this normal peace is the
growing state strength and coherence during the 20th century in
the region. This is especially true with regard to the territorial
identity of the states in South America. This evolution is in con-
trast to both the state weakness in the region during the 19th
century and the domestic illegitimacy of certain regimes, which
lasted at least until the recent wave of democratization in the 1980s.
South America was better disposed than Europe to enjoy peace
relatively early because the state-to-nation balance was more sym-
metrical there in an earlier stage. Such symmetry reflects the
emergence of territorially-based, non-ethnic (or civic) nationalism
and the relative weakness of both ethnic/sub-national secessionist
forces and pan-national revisionism. Benedict Anderson writes
about the emergence of national identities (“nation-ness”) in South
America, well before most of Europe, which were compatible with
the territorial boundaries of the colonial administrative units that
became independent states. He argues that “the original shaping
of the American administrative units was to some extent arbitrary
and fortuitous, marking the spatial limits of particular military con-
quests. But, over time, they developed a firmer reality under the
influence of geographic, political and economic factors” (1991, p.
52). Thus, the European settlers (the Creoles) consciously
redefined the non-white populations in their territorial states as
“fellow-nationals” (p. 50).63 At same time, “the ‘failure’ of the
Spanish-American experience to generate a permanent Spanish-
American-wide nationalism reflects both the general level of
development of capitalism and technology in late eighteenth
century and the ‘local’ backwardness of Spanish capitalism and
technology in relation to the administrative stretch of the empire”
(p. 63).
 While pan- and sub-nationalism and their de-stabilizing
effects were much weaker than in Europe, still 19th century South
American states were relatively weak and incoherent and thus most
63. For a comparative discussion and qualifications, see Connor (1994), esp.
p. 79.
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boundaries were not clearly defined and some states seized terri-
tories belonging to their neighbors. Argentina, for example, was
highly fragmented during most of the 19th century.64 There was
no effective central government whose authority was accepted by
all. Monopoly over the use of force was absent: every city and
province had its own militia, and different war-lords (Caudillos)
had their private militias. Also absent were a central constitution
and a common judiciary and there was no central education system
apart from that of the Church. The period was characterized by a
continuous struggle between the hegemonic attempts of Buenos-
Aires and the aspirations of the provinces for autonomy and inde-
pendence from the center. During the 1870s there was both an
intensive fighting between the white settlers and the Indians in the
frontier and armed conflicts between the different regions and
Caudillos. Indeed, the incoherence of the Argentinean state,
together with the weakness of the neighboring states at that time,
made the region conducive to wars. Thus, the weakness of Argen-
tina brought about the intervention of its neighbors in its territory,
especially Brazil and also forces from Uruguay and Paraguay.65
Moreover, state weakness generated diversionary wars such as the
participation of Argentina in the war against Paraguay.66
Only since 1880s political stability began to prevail through
the dominance achieved by the center over the provinces.67 This
superiority was based first of all on a monopoly over the use of
force reached by the national army which disarmed the militias.
State coherence was augmented by an expansion of the central
administrative-judicial control into the provinces supported by an
impressive economic growth in the late 19th century and early
20th century. Moreover, the elites succeeded in helping to cons-
truct a common Argentinean identity and unifying national myths.
Even though there were conflicts between liberal and nationalist
variants and sharp ideological disagreements about political and
socio-economic affairs, all shared a collective Argentinean identity
including a common territorial identity of the nation-state.68
64. See Merquior (1987); Lynch (1993).
65. Shumway (1991), pp. 169-70.
66. Shumway (1991), pp. 237-40.
67. Gallo (1993); Kacowicz (1996), p. 19.
68. Shumway (1991).
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This development is also true for other states in the region.
Thus, in the 20th century, the territorial identity of the states in
South America has become more firmly established and there has
been growing state strength and coherence in the region. Citizens
may have been alienated from particular governments, as many
were before the democratization of the 1980s, but they have generally
accepted and defended the overall identity of their states, including
their territorial integrity and dimensions. Despite a great variety of
powerful domestic grievances, and in contrast to other Third
World and Balkans states, disaffected domestic groups in South
American states have not sought secession as a solution to their
problems. Rather, levels of citizen identification with their states have
been progressively strengthening (Holsti 1996, pp. 173-75).
Neither the change from the 19th century war-prone South
America to a much more peaceful region, nor the comparative
differences between South America and other regions can be
explained by the international factor of US hegemony. First of all,
South America has been a secondary arena for all the great
powers69 in comparison with Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
Even US engagement in the region, especially in the strategic
domain, was much more limited than in the US sphere of influence
in Central America. In contrast to the numerous military interven-
tions in the latter region, the US did not intervene militarily in
South America and even clandestine interferences (like in Chile in
the early 1970s) were rare.70 In the absence of a credible and
persistent threat of intervention, it is difficult to see the US as a
hegemon in South America (in contrast to Central America). Had
the US hegemony been the major cause of regional peace, recent
international changes should supposedly have had de-stabilizing
effects on the region because US influence in South America has
been steadily declining in the last thirty years, with the rise of
regional powers such as Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, and the
consolidation of international links between South American states
and Europe, Japan, and the former Soviet Union.71 And yet, not
69. Fraser (1997), pp. 160-61; Kacowicz (1996), p. 20.
70. Thus, President Theodore Roosevelt confined his amendment to the
Monro Doctrine to the Caribbean Basin alone. See Schoultz 1998,
pp. 192-7, 203-4 cited in Kagan (2000, ch. 5, p. 8).
71. See Pastor (1992), and Kacowicz (1996, pp. 19-20; 1998, p. 67).
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only has peace in South America persisted but it has been upgraded
in recent years despite these international changes. Indeed, the
character of the regional peace goes beyond internationally-
produced cold peace in that most substantive issues in conflict
among the regional states have been resolved rather than merely
mitigated or reduced. As noted, the achievement of such a level of
peace is beyond the capabilities of external powers.
While a normal peace has evolved in South America during this
century, until recently it did not go much beyond an inter-state
peaceful resolution of territorial disputes. However, in the last few
years a process of upgrading the normal peace and the evolution
of warm regional peace has begun in the Southern Cone of South
America. This warming of the regional peace follows the recent
wave of democratization and liberalization there. The major mani-
festations of this process are increased economic interdependence
and the enhancement of economic and political integration, notably,
the emergence of a Common Market—Mercosur, which includes
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay.72 There is also growing
cooperation with regard to common transborder problems such as
the environment and drug trafficking. This rising regional coopera-
tion and integration stands in complete contrast to the failure of
previous attempts at economic cooperation and integration, which
collapsed when the domestic regimes in South America were
authoritarian (Schmitter 1991, pp. 115-116).
3. The Effects of Regional Integration > Warm Regional Peace
Partly in response to the difficulties of the conflict resolution approach
in regions with a state-to-nation imbalance, the third approach
prescribes that the best strategy to achieve regional peace is not to
focus on the substantive state-to-nation and related territorial issues
that are in conflict between the parties but to transcend them by
regional integration. In other words, the best way to reach peace
is by establishing effective regional institutions for collective secur-
ity and arms control, regional economic integration, and cooperation
in other issues of common concern such as the environment. More
specifically, the leading theory of integration, neofunctionalism,
72. See Schmitter (1991, pp. 108-121); Holsti (1996, pp. 175-180); Kacowicz
(1998); Solingen (1998).
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suggested that growing interdependence would lead to the esta-
blishment of supranational institutions. These institutions, led by
technical elites and international bureaucrats, would initially deal
with the management of technical “low politics” type of problems.
But the rising complexity of interdependence and the self-sustain-
ing process of institution-building would eventually lead to the
“spill over” of the regional integration to the domain of “high
politics.” Thus, regional institutions would have increasing juris-
diction over the pre-existing national states. This would result in
a transfer of loyalties from the nation-state and the redefinition of
collective identities toward a regional identity.73
Figure 6: The Process of Regional Integration
rising interdependence > low-politics > spill-over to high politics > shifting
loyalties from the states institutions to regional institutions
Another method for strengthening peace according to the
integrative approach is by creating a regional community through
advancing transnational contacts among the regional societies,
nongovernmental groups, and encouraging people-to-people ties
through social communications, tourism and cultural exchange.74
Thus, this approach differs markedly from, and goes much beyond
the governmental, state-to-state character of the regional conflict
resolution strategy. Indeed, regional integration and transnational
contacts might be seen by non-liberal, nationalist elites as posing
a threat to the independence and autonomy of their states, which
is a mainstay of regional peace according to the conflict resolution/
state building approach. In contrast to the focus of the conflict reso-
lution/statist approach on the strict preservation of state sovereignty
and on non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states as
a prerequisite for peace, the integration strategy is based on signi-
ficant compromises to state sovereignty and on the transfer of
73. See Haas (1958, 1964); Lindberg (1963), Lindberg and Scheingold, eds.,
(1971). For a useful overview, see Hurrell (1995), pp. 59-61.
74. See Deutsch (1957). For a recent development and revision of Deutsch’s
approach to community building along constructivist lines, see Adler
and Barnett (1998).
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authorities from the states to supra-national institutions leading to
joint decision-making and the pooling of sovereignty.75
Some of the supposed effects of regional integration on the
emergence of warm peace are:
1. Politically – the joint decision-making and pooling of
sovereignty would diminish the capacity of national govern-
ments to act unilaterally, including in the area of war and
peace, especially vis-a-vis the other members. At the same
time, a certain degree of freedom of action may remain vis-
a-vis third parties.
2. Economically – interdependence would make it very dif-
ficult to act alone and would limit the independent war-
making ability of the individual states. Interdependence
would increase mutual prosperity and thus increase the
stakes of many key groups and the public at large in the
continuation and intensification of the economic relations
rather than disrupt them by war. Thus, on a cost-benefit
calculation territorial gains will not worth the loss incurred
by the disruption of the economic interdependence (in
addition to the costs of the war itself). Even if the integra-
tion starts in “low politics” (economics, environment), over
time there will be a spillover to “high politics” (security and
foreign policy).76
3. Sense of community – common supra-national institutions,
strong economic ties and intensive transnational interactions
in the areas of culture, tourism and commerce lead to the
construction of a sense of community and shared identity
and mutual identification at the expense of exclusionary and
aggressive nationalism. Thus, it becomes unimaginable that
the members of the community will fight each other along
national lines.
75. Keohane and Hoffmann (1990), p. 276. See also Kupchan (1998).
76. Haas (1958, 1964), summarized by Scmitter (1969), cited in Russett and
Starr (1992, p. 384).
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The Conditions for the Effectiveness
of the Integration Strategy:
the prevalence of liberal compatibility
Although rarely explored explicitly, liberal democracy is a necessary,
even if not always sufficient, condition for successful integration.77
Thus, the neofunctionalist approach to regional integration pre-
sumed without stating explicitly that the states undergoing
integration are pluralist democracies. This is because the core
integrating mechanism of the neofunctional approach, the autono-
mous action of specialized interest groups pressing for further
integration in order to capture greater economic benefits, can only
operate in a liberal democracy.78 Moreover, liberal democracy can
mitigate the aggressive and de-stabilizing aspects of nationalism.
Where democratic norms are closely related to national self-images,
nationalism may support peaceful democracy by advancing iden-
tifications with civic institutions.79
 There is a qualitative difference between democracies and
authoritarian regimes with respect to integration, because the latter
type of regime is in itself a major obstacle to integration. These
regimes tend to suppress or distort negotiations among transnational
interest groups and to assert their passionate defense of national
sovereignty as the major source of domestic legitimacy (Schmitter
1991, p. 115). A major reason for the necessary connection bet-
ween democracy and regional integration may be deduced from
the democratic peace theory: only among liberal democracies is the
security dilemma sufficiently reduced to allow the states to surrender
a part of their sovereignty, without the fear that today’s partner
may become tomorrow’s enemy. As a result, democracies are rela-
tively more willing to concede voluntarily some sovereignty to a
supranational authority—on the condition that all the states
involved in the integration are democracies. Even then, the conces-
sion of sovereignty will initially be quite limited, the process of
integration is likely to be very lengthy and painstaking, and reversals
are quite possible.
77. Schmitter (1991, p. 114); Hurrell (1995, pp. 68-69).
78. See Schmitter (1991, p. 114); Hurrell (1995, p. 59).
79. Snyder and Ballentine (1996, p. 11 and the citations they cite).
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The cornerstone of the liberal approach is democratization, and
all the other elements (free market economies, regional institutions
and integration, and transnational ties) only ensure warm peace when
the regional states are liberal democracies.80 The great advantage of
the liberal strategy is manifested in the empirical record of liberal-
democratic states not fighting each other.81 Even if some substan-
tive issues remain unresolved among liberal democracies, they do
not resort to force in order to resolve them but use peaceful means
only, and as a result the security dilemma among them declines
drastically. Consequently, stable warm peace will be established in
a region populated by liberal democracies. Indeed, a liberal-
democratic Western Europe has succeeded to establish a warm peace
among its regional states in the post-World War II era (see below).
The shortcoming of this approach is the demanding political
and socio-economic prerequisites for successful democratization82
while, for this strategy to work, all the major regional states have
to become stable liberal democracies. A major precondition for a
stable democracy is the existence of a strong state in the sense
defined above.83 Thus, one of the obstacles to successful democra-
tization and the emergence of a stable democracy is the presence
of an intense ethnic conflict in divided societies.84 Yet, these are
precisely the places where the supposedly pacifying effects of demo-
cratization are most needed, not only because of the domestic ethnic
conflicts, but also because of the close relations between such
conflicts and regional conflicts due to the spread of ethnic groups
across existing borders in many regions, especially in the Third
World and the Balkans.85
Another major problem with the liberalization strategy is that
as noted, in the short term democratization may increase domestic
80. On the liberal school in international relations, see Nye (1988), Keohane
(1989), Baldwin (1993), Zacher and Matthew (1995), Doyle (1997), and
Moravcsik (1997).
81. For explanations and critiques, see Russett (1993); Doyle (1997), part 2;
and Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (1996).
82. See Huntington (1991). For a recent review of the research on the
political and socio-economic conditions for democracy and on how
states become democracies, see Shin (1994).
83. Rothstein (1992); Ayoob (1995, p. 195).
84. For an overview, see Diamond and Plattner (1994), p. xiv.
85. See Diamond and Plattner (1994, p. xxviii); and Ayoob (1995).
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instability and provide insecure elites with incentives to pursue the
scapegoat strategy by initiating diversionary wars against their
neighbors. Indeed, Mansfield and Snyder (1996) show that at least
until all the regional states become full-blown liberal democracies,
the process of democratization itself may encourage the use of
force and thus aggravate regional conflicts. Elites left over from the
old regime compete over political power among themselves and
with new democratic elites. One of the major strategies available to
all these elites for gaining mass support is appealing to nationalist
feelings. Once mass support for this strategy is mobilized, leaders
have a hard time controlling it in democratizing states which tend
to lack effective institutions. A nationalist public and belligerent
pressure-groups may push for a militant policy and constrain the
freedom of maneuver of foreign policy elites. Especially bellicose
are interest groups from the old regime that benefit from impe-
rialism, military expansion and war (Snyder and Mansfield 1996,
pp. 303, 315-331).
Democratization can increase the identification of citizens with
their state and thus strengthen regional states in the long run.
However, a related negative effect of democratization in the short
term is that in fragmented societies, notably in Africa and some
other parts of the Third World and the Balkans, it may not solve
social cleavages but may rather exacerbate existing ethnic
problems,86 and even embolden ethnic minorities to oppose openly
their national boundaries and seek self-determination and secession.87
One major route to democratization is federalism—decentralization
of political power along territorial lines. In weak states, a loose federal
system may reinforce separatist forces by guaranteeing them assets
they can employ for the secessionist cause, such as local police forces
and government revenues.88
In other cases, democratization may weaken moderate/status
quo regimes and elites which are the key to regional peace processes,
and make it more difficult for them to make concessions to long-
time adversaries. Through an appeal to nationalist and religious
86. For a specification of the conditions under which this may happen, see
De Nevers (1993). For a study that shows the de-stabilizing effects of
political and economic liberalization in war-shattered states, see Paris (1997).
87. Ayoob (1995), p. 182; Chipman (1993); Holsti (1996); and Kaplan (2000).
88. Holsti (1996, pp. 184-85).
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emotions, a domestic opposition may use these concessions against
the moderate elites and undermine their political base of support.
Democratization may also bring to power radical forces which oppose
regional reconciliation, for example, Fundamentalist Islamic forces
in the Middle East.
Thus, democratization may bring about the disintegration of
the regional states or the intensification of ethnic and regional
conflicts or both. If there is a stark choice between maintaining the
territorial integrity of the state and democratization, state elites are
bound to prefer the former over the latter.89 At the same time the
historical record shows that in the absence of democratization, the
other liberal prescriptions such as economic interdependence, free
trade and regional institutions, may not be sufficient by themselves
to ensure regional peace (Mearsheimer 1990, 1995).
Thus, I argue that in the absence of a minimum extent of a
state-to-nation symmetry and of strong and coherent states, libera-
lization may not enhance peace and may even destabilize the
region, at least for the short-run. A minimal extent of successful
state-building and nation-building is required in order to make
possible the pacifying effects of integration based on the compati-
bility of liberal states.
Thus, the major challenge presented by the liberalization strategy
is how to dampen the negative effects that the democratization
process creates in the short term, before arriving at stable liberal
democracies and warm peace in the longer term. In addition to a
prerequisite of certain degree of successful state-building and nation-
building, one possibility for solving this dilemma is by combining
the liberalization strategy with the international strategy of great
power involvement. The great power hegemon or a concert of
powers may then prevent regional wars and maintain cold peace,
and thus allow the liberalization process to develop and ripen into
warm peace. This was indeed the road to peace in post-1945 Western
Europe.
89. Ayoob (1995), pp. 182-184. Ayoob (1995, p. 182) cites Weiner’s obser-
vation that even in India, the most consistently democratic major Third
World state, “if need be, the center would exercise all the force at its
command to prevent secession even if it meant a suspension of demo-
cratic rights.” Ayoob adds that the events of the recent years in Punjab
and Kashmir show the validity of this argument.
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Post-1945 Western Europe: Domestic Liberalization >
Transcending the state-to-nation problem by Regional
Integration > Transition from War to Warm Peace
The Integration Strategy’s Effects > Warm peace
In comparison with South America, Europe was both much more
of a war-zone until World War II and had suffered from many
more state-to-nation problems than the New World. Europe was
the major war-zone in the international system until 1945. Most
great powers were European and competed among themselves for
power, hegemony, security and influence on the continent and for
overseas colonies. Yet, the state-to-nation asymmetry affected many
of the key rivalries and armed conflicts on the continent during the
19th and 20th centuries, including the two world wars, notably
the wars for German and Italian unifications, the competing natio-
nalist-irredentist claims of Germany and France vis-a-vis Elzes-
Lauren, Pan-Slavic aspirations and struggles for self-determination
in Eastern Europe and the Balkans leading to World War I, and
German demands for national unification in Central and Eastern
Europe producing tense crises before World War II.
The deportation of millions of Germans from Eastern Europe
and the imposed division of Germany and Soviet control over
Eastern Europe following World War II helped to reduce or at
least to manage the national, especially the German, problem on
the continent, although the continuos division also meant that this
problem was not fully resolved. Western Europe did not focus,
however, on direct conflict resolution of state-to-nation problems,
even if some of these issues were addressed successfully. Western
Europe transcended the state-to-nation issues through regional
integration which generated warm peace.
The first major Western European supranational institution
was the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951
by the initiative of then French foreign minister, Robert Schuman,
with the explicit goal of limiting the independent war-making
ability of the Western European states, most notably the former
arch-enemies France and Germany and only a secondary goal was
to contribute to economic welfare.90 Thus, he stated that “the
90. H. Wyatt-Walter (1997), p. 19.
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French Government proposes to put the whole of the Franco-
German coal and steel production under a joint High Authority,
in an organization which is open for the other European countries
to enter... The solidarity between the two countries established by
joint production will show that a war between France and Ger-
many becomes not only unthinkable but materially impossible”
(cited in Russett and Starr 1992, p. 379). One of the major moti-
vations for the Schuman’s initiative was the worsening Franco-
German relations at the time, mainly due to the Saar problem.91
The Saar was economically linked to France and politically
autonomous from Germany, but the latter refused to recognize its
separation from the Federal Republic. The French were particularly
anxious about the progress of German economic and political revival
and the calls for German rearmament. Schuman’s idea was not so
much to focus directly on addressing the bilateral issues in conflict
between France and Germany, but rather to transcend them by a
reconciliation of Germany within a transformed European frame-
work. Indeed, the integration of coal and steel made possible new
relations between France and Germany and gave France the lead-
ing role in the building of a European Community, the driving
force of which was going to be Franco-German.92 More specifi-
cally, in the context of integration it is easier for democracies to
transcend territorial issues. Thus, France returned the Saar region
to Germany following the outcome in a referendum in which most
of the region’s population expressed its will to return to Germany.
 The next major step of Western European integration was the
establishment of the Common Market or the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1957, later transformed into the European
Community (EC). This institution had broad supranational autho-
rity, notably to eliminate barriers to trade within the community
and to make possible a free movement of capital and people among
the member states, thus fulfilling Jean Monnet’s vision of binding
the economies and eventually the people of Western Europe inex-
91. See the discussion in Gerbet (1996, esp. pp. 66-70).
92. The new regional context also made it much easier to resolve the Saar
problem peacefully. The Saar was eventually linked both politically and
economically with the Federal Republic following a referendum, in which
67% of the voters opted for Germany. On the Saar Conflict, see
Freymond (1957), and Hannuum (1990), pp. 394-400.
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tricably by economic union, making war unthinkable (Russett and
Starr 1992, p. 379).93 After a slow-down in the integration process
between 1967 and 1985, it regained powerful momentum with
the successful negotiation and ratification of the Single European
Act in the mid-1980s.94
Beyond a certain point of stabilization, a warm peace among
liberal democracies should stand on its own. Thus, even though
the US presence is still very important for the security of the
Western European states (Art 1996), the present study (as opposed
to realist predictions)95 does not expect that the potential US
military disengagement from Europe or at least a reduction in its
presence following the disappearance of the Soviet threat will
dramatically affect the warm peace in the region. On the contrary,
the tendency in recent years, in the aftermath of the end of the
Cold War, has been the reinforcement of the Western European
warm peace and the deepening of regional integration. This
tendency is manifested in the December 1991 Maastricht Treaty,
the creation of a single currency—the Euro—in 1999, the agree-
ment to enlarge the Western European Union (WEU), the Schengen
Group of eight (originally five) countries attempting to move more
rapidly toward common policies on policing and border controls,
and the Franco-German “Eurocorps” with its stated aspirations to
create the nucleus for a future European army.
Indeed, following NATO air war over Kosovo, the European
Union decided in late 1999 to construct its own European security
force of 60,000 troops.96 Thus the Kosovo conflict demonstrated
the dual face of European security in the post-Cold War period.
On the one hand, it showed the European military inferiority in
93. For a succinct analysis of the West European integration within a
broader European and international context, see Wallace (1995). Jean
Monnet, a French official, was a leading advocate and founding father
of Western European integration in the early 1950s.
94. For an extended analysis of the recent stages of the evolution of Euro-
pean integration, including the Act and its effects, see Keohane and
Hoffmann (1991) and Wallace (1995).
95. See Mearsheimer (1990); Sheetz (1996).
96. Joseph Fitchett, “EU completes plan for own forces.” International Herald
Tribune, Dec. 10, 1999, p. 4; and Craig Whitney, “Europe’s mobile
forces: an uncertain factor for U.S. strategists.” International Herald
Tribune, Dec. 13, 1999, p. 5.
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relation to the US and the great military dependence of the Euro-
peans on the US for coping with external threats of spreading
instability related to ethnic conflicts such as those in the Balkans.
At the same time, the Kosovo crisis exerted pressure on the Euro-
peans to further upgrade their security cooperation, even if it is still
questionable how fast and how effectively they will implement
their new commitment toward increased integration in the security
field.
The Conditions for the strategy’s effectiveness:
Liberalization Under US Hegemony
The effectiveness of the integration strategy has been due to the
liberalization process in all the key states of Western Europe and
due to US hegemony, which was crucial especially in the early
stages of the transition from war to warm peace.
The main historical example of the influence of liberal demo-
cracy on the success of regional integration and the emergence of
warm peace among liberal states is the warm West European peace
established in the aftermath of World War II. Such a warm peace
could not have been established without the major Western Euro-
pean states being liberal democracies, with West Germany under-
going a forced democratization during the allied occupation.
Indeed, the level of supranational integration has remained limited
in all non-democratic regions outside of the liberal-democratic
Western Europe. Although US hegemony over the region has
been crucial for the initial establishment of peace in Western
Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was unable by itself
to produce a normal, let alone a warm peace.97
The initial post-World War II Western European peace was
indeed made possible by the US pacifying role as a benign
97. Kupchan (1998) offers an alternative explanation to Western European
integration focusing on the relative symmetry of power among W. Eu-
ropean states leading to greater reliance on consensual governance. He
argues that this relative symmetry explains the greater extent of institu-
tionalization than in N. America and E. Asia. He overlooks the crucial
role of liberal compatibility which explains why in other relatively sym-
metrical regions such as the Middle East, Balkans and S. America re-
gional integration did not develop as successfully as in Europe.
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hegemon,98 which was in turn made possible by the common
Soviet threat to the US and to Western Europe.99 Without the
conducive international factor of US leadership, peace among the
West European states might not have developed, as French-
German relations in the late 1940s-early 1950s might suggest.
In the late 1940s these relations were close to a cold war.
Immediately following the war, France’s greatest fear was that a
resurgent Germany would once again challenge the legitimacy of
the political and territorial order in Europe. Such a danger was to
be prevented by the dismemberment of Germany, its demilitarization
and French control over the Rhine. Moreover, the French demanded
control over German resources, especially its production of coal
and steel.100 Yet, the dynamics of the Cold War and its own weak-
ness forced France to change direction in terms of its “German”
policy. This did not mean, however, that the French attitude
towards Germany changed abruptly. When it became clear that
France could no longer afford attempts to balance, or contain,
Germany, other options were developed.
The combined effect of US hegemony and the common Soviet
threat produced a transition in 1950 from cold war, in which
France tried to dismember Germany and keep it weak and power-
less to cold peace, in which the two states accepted each other’s
existence and reached formal agreements, but still had some
substantive conflicts to resolve and there was still a high extent of
mutual insecurity.
Thus, in 1954 France did not join the European Defense
Community, which excluded the US and Britain, because in that
framework France would have been left essentially alone with its
former archenemy.101 In contrast, US and Britain’s membership in
NATO provided guarantees against potential German aggression.
98. See Hurrell (1995), p. 48; Joffe (1984) citing also Nerlich (1979), p. 88.
99. See Lundestad (1990), p. 57; Gaddis (1992), pp. 26-27; Buzan (1991),
pp. 220-21; Wallace (1995). On the common Soviet threat as a unifying
factor for West Germany and its European neighbors, see Gerbet (1996,
p. 58).
100. See Geraud (1947), p. 33. On De Gaule’s demands regarding the Rhine
as the French border, see Freymond (1960), p. 6.
101. See Joffe (1984), pp. 69-73 and (1987), ch. 5. See also Gerbet (1996,
pp. 72-75) and Gillingham (1991, p. 250).
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On the whole, the US has played a crucial role in regional conflict
reduction in Western Europe by helping to reassure West Germany
and its neighbors of each other’s peaceful intentions, thus reducing
the regional security dilemma in a once volatile region. Since the
US took upon its shoulders the role of security provider to the
Europeans, they did not have to take care of their security and that
weakened drastically the security dilemma among them and made
possible a separation between high politics and low politics. The
Europeans could focus on the economic dimension, more precisely
on mutual or absolute gains in this domain, while the US security
umbrella weakened the concern about relative gains among
them.102
The international factor of US hegemony was insufficient by
itself to produce the warm peace that has gradually emerged in
Western Europe since the late 1950s. The liberal democratic
nature of the West European states was necessary to upgrade the
cold peace and turn it into the warm peace of the European
Community and the European Union through the strategy of
regional integration.
Accordingly, the domestic liberalization in formerly authorita-
rian Western European states, especially in West Germany, in the
post-World War II era was critical for the evolution of the warm
peace by permanently removing the traditional causes of war on
the continent.103 The American security umbrella facilitated this
evolution and allowed it to take place. Moreover, the US induced
the democratization and social reform process in West Germany in
the immediate aftermath of World War II.104 But the socio-econo-
mic prerequisites for democracy had to be present in West Germany
(and also in Italy) for democratization to succeed. The US also
spurred European integration by direct encouragement and pres-
sure (Beloff 1963, p. 28; Treverton 1992, ch. 4; Hurrell 1995, p. 48;
Ikenberry 1989, pp. 388-89; Gerbet 1996, p. 60), but for high-
level integration to be successful, economic and also political com-
patibility were necessary. Indeed, a key prerequisite for joining the
EU is a functioning democracy.
102. On relative vs. absolute gains, see Grieco (1998), and on the competing
neorealist and neoliberal views on this question se Baldwin, ed. (1993).
103. See Van Evera (1993), esp. pp. 206-211; Buzan et al. (1990), pp. 107-115.
104. See Smith (1994).
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General De Gaulle and Mrs. Thatcher have shown that there
can be powerful opposition to integration even among democra-
cies. Yet, it is difficult to imagine the regional integration in West-
ern Europe without the factor of liberal democracy, which reduced
mutual fears to the point of making the regional states willing to
give up a part of their sovereignty and set up supra-national institu-
tions. These, in turn, have helped to build institutionalized pro-
cedures for peaceful conflict resolution. Such developments have
conspired to make a return to violent conflict in Western Europe
unthinkable.
The Logic of An Integrated-Gradual Approach
There is a trade-off between the regional and the international
strategies for advancing regional peace. While the regional/
domestic strategies are more desirable than the international one in
that they are conducive to higher levels of regional peace, they are
less feasible, as nation-to-state problems are hard to resolve and
liberalization depends on demanding prerequisites. In contrast, the
international strategy is more feasible (to the extent that the necessary
international conditions are present), but this mechanism is unable
by itself to go beyond cold peace and produce higher levels of
peace. Yet, as noted, the international strategy may fulfill an impor-
tant role when combined with the liberalization strategy for
achieving warm peace. The two regional/domestic strategies are
also distinctive and there are trade-offs and contradictions between
them, notably with regard to strengthening or democratizing
existing states and also concerning the role of governments versus
transnational actors in the peacemaking process. The conflict reso-
lution/statist approach focuses on maintaining the norm of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other states. In contrast, the
liberalization strategy acknowledges the necessity to subordinate
this traditional international society norm to emerging transnational
norms of democratization and human rights, which are seen as the
most effective guarantees of a lasting peace.105
While the three levels of peace have been described as analy-
tically distinct, they may also be regarded as successive stages in a
105. See Baker (1996), pp. 563-571.
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regional peace process, with each stage conducive to the next one.
Thus, great power involvement (either in the form of concert or
hegemony) is conducive to a cold regional peace in which the
substantive issues in conflict and the problems of regional legi-
timacy have been moderated or reduced, but are still far from
being fully resolved. This conflict reduction may strengthen the
regional states at the expense of pan- and sub-national forces because
of two major developments. The first one is that the aid provided
by the great powers as an inducement for participation in the peace
process increases the resources at the disposal of the local states
which can use them for state-building. The aid will also increase
the states’ ability and willingness to prevail over domestic/
secessionists and external pan-national challenges to their states by
both sticks and carrots. The external aid will also increase the
support of domestic constituencies in the regional peace process
due to the economic benefits associated with it. Similarly, the
growing stability in the region will also attract new investments
and may bring about an economic boom and thus broadening the
domestic coalitions supporting accommodation.
The second development is the decline in the political power
and popular appeal of revisionists/nationalists as the peace process
progresses and various national problems (related to territorial claims)
are reduced and the sense of mutual security is rising under the
reassuring great power umbrella, which also contains the power of
the revisionist states. Thus, nationalist forces inside the states,
which are taking part in the peace process, are marginalized and
their power to obstruct peace processes is declining because the
external enemies are less threatening and the substantive compo-
nents of the conflict are in the process of being reduced. For
example, as refugees are resettled, there is a decline in the support
for guerrilla or terrorist organizations, which have challenged state
coherence in the region; freedom of access to holy nationalist/
religious sites reduces the claim to control them exclusively. Growing
segments of the publics see the issues in a more pragmatic light as
security and economic state interests rather than as emotionally-
laden nationalist symbols on which compromise in neither feasible
nor desirable. This progress may encourage and allow the local
elites to show the necessary flexibility in order to proceed toward
the resolution of the disputed state-to-nation issues and their terri-
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torial manifestations, and thus to allow the establishment of normal
peace.
This level of peace is, in turn, conducive to a domestic libe-
ralization of the regional states. As a recent study shows, demo-
cratization in Scandinavia and North America was preceded by the
achievement of normal peace which quelled the rivalry among the
states for regional hegemony.106 International threats reinforce the
power of anti-democratic forces in the domestic politics of states
involved in protracted conflict. The anti-democratic elements con-
trolling the state use the external threats to justify the limits to
political freedom inside the state supposedly in order to not
undermine the internal unity vis-a-vis the external enemy.107 In
contrast, a moderation in the level of external threats reduces both
the necessity, and the pretext, for the repression of democratic
opposition.108 Such an environment is also conducive to a growing
trust among the regional states, allowing for the establishment of
regional institutions and the development of transnational relations
and thus the evolution of warm peace.
I illustrate how the idea of a gradual progress toward a warm
peace can be implemented, for example, in the Middle East, using
successively all three peacemaking strategies. However, such an
implementation is going to be an uphill battle because there are
still strong forces which increase the state-to-nation asymmetry in
the region: nationalist/irredentist on both sides advancing competing
claims over boundaries and territories but, in fact, reinforcing the
political appeal of each other; Israeli settlers in the occupied terri-
tories and their supporters; Palestinians refugees claiming the right
of return; and a major nationalist struggle over the future of Jeru-
salem.
At the first stage, the US can help in resolving the Palestinian
problem—a major source of instability in the region—by brokering
a negotiated agreement on the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Such a hegemonic-brokered settlement may produce only a cold
peace. Yet, a clear-cut political separation between the two parties
(Israel and the Palestinians) is likely to reduce the points of
106. See Thompson (1996).
107. This is based on the logic of the scapegoat or diversionary theory dis-
cussed above.
108. See Gurr (1988).
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potential clash among them. American security guarantees and
reassurances to both sides can diminish their mutual fears and
security dilemmas. Over time a normal peace may evolve to the
extent that the demarcation of recognized boundaries and the
mutual recognition will confer legitimacy on each state by the
public of the other side. Having a state of their own will increase
the Palestinian stake in the status-quo (due to fears of what they
can lose if they behave aggressively) and reduce the appeal of the
revisionist—irredentist forces, leading, in turn, to a reciprocal
decline in the power of the revisionists inside Israel. The fulfillment
of the national aspirations of the Palestinians is likely also to
diminish the power of radical Pan-Arabism since fighting for the
stateless Palestinians has ostensibly been one of its main causes.
The Palestinian state, for its part, will have to disarm the remain-
ing revisionist forces and thus establish a strong and coherent state,
which has a monopoly of the means of violence inside its territory.
Such a monopoly will reduce terrorist activities against Israelis and
thus increase their support of the peace process. The Palestinian
state will also have to build effective institutions and create the
capacity to deliver social and economic services and thus increase its
domestic legitimacy. External powers will be able to play an
important role in providing aid for these purposes: both financial
and know-how. But the success of this institution-building will
eventually depend on the political and economic system of the
Palestinians. Such a success is likely to help to absorb many
Palestinian refugees in their own state and thus moderate their claim
for exercising the right of return to Israel. Addressing the refugee
problem will remove a major revisionist source of regional
instability. In the early stages of the state-building, an immediate
full-blown democratization might be too premature and even have
destabilizing consequences. However, as soon as the institution-
building reaches a certain level of maturity, liberalization,
encouraged by the hegemon, may produce the conditions for a
warm liberal peace, including some degree of economic integration.
Conclusions
This study establishes linkages between three mechanisms for
regional peacemaking and three types of peace. Not less important,
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the article specifies the conditions necessary for the effectiveness of
these strategies. One of the mechanisms is international (great
power intervention in the form of either a great power concert or
hegemony) and two are regional/domestic (regional conflict reso-
lution and regional integration). The regional/domestic strategies
are more desirable because they can bring about higher levels of
peace, namely, normal peace (by conflict resolution among strong
and coherent states) or warm peace (through integration but only
if it takes place among liberal democracies). The international stra-
tegy can produce, at best, only a relatively low level of peace, that
is, cold peace. Yet, the international mechanism can be useful to
the extent that the regional strategies are not feasible, while the
international one is available. In some important regions this might
be the case. For example, the Middle East is not ready yet for a
Western European style of regional integration leading to warm
peace due to the weakness of all the liberal factors in the region
(especially the absence of liberal democracies, but also international
institutions, economic interdependence or transnational ties); thus,
former Israeli prime minister Peres’ idea of a “New Middle East”
(1993) is premature. Moreover, in the short term democratization
in the Middle East can be destabilizing because it may weaken
status quo elites and regimes and bring to power radical Islamic
Fundamentalist forces. Thus, it might also be undesirable for the
purpose of promoting regional peace.
At the same time, despite some considerable progress made in
the Middle East peace process during the 1990s, the regional
actors have a hard time resolving the regional state-to-nation
problems on their own. There are still powerful nationalist-
irredentist forces both in Israel and in the Arab world. There are
also strong sub-national forces in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq which
challenge the stability of these states and make them incoherent. In
such states the regimes face powerful nationalist and ethnic
opposition, which constrains their ability to resolve conflicts fully
and to establish normal peace with ex-enemies. Yet so long as US
hegemony over the region prevails, there is a window of
opportunity for the establishment of a regional cold peace, which
may, in turn, facilitate progress toward normal peace, that is,
settling the substantive issues in dispute between Israel and the
Arabs like sovereignty, boundaries, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem
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and other territorial questions. Such a resolution will enhance the
level of regional legitimacy, strengthen local states, and reduce
markedly the danger of war. Resolution of the Palestinian refugee
problem, for example, will diminish the reservoir of new recruits to
guerrilla and terrorist organizations and thus reduce Israeli security
fears and increase Israel’s willingness to make concessions. A
comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian problem will reduce
the opposition in the Arab world to the establishment of normal
peace with Israel. In the longer term, the enhancement of regional
legitimacy and normal peace is favorable for the evolution over time
of democratization and economic interdependence in the region,
and thus for a gradual emergence of a warm peace in a “New
Middle East,” even if very slowly and with many ups and downs.
The case of South America shows that the presence of relatively
strong/coherent states, and a relatively high degree of regional
state-to-nation compatibility, enables a successful process of con-
flict resolution generating a normal peace, even if not a perfect
one. Democratization under these conditions may bring about a
more successful regional integration than among authoritarian states,
and thus a gradual emergence of a warm peace. The Western
European case shows that democracy is indeed the key for effective
integration and the emergence of warm peace. But it also shows
that a benign hegemony has to play a crucial role in the early stages
in the evolution of warm peace, in facilitating the transition of
former arch-enemies like France and Germany to peaceful and
cooperative relations. An intensive engagement by a hegemon was
much more needed in Europe in the post-World War II period
than in 20th century South America so as to make possible a
dramatic transition from a long history of hot and cold wars to a
warm peace, with only a relatively brief intermediate stage of
normal peace. In South America, in contrast, the evolution of
normal peace proceeded slowly over a long period of time,
encompassing almost the whole 20th century. In the Middle East,
however, due to the lengthy period of hot and cold wars and the
severe problems of state-to-nation, an intensive hegemonic involve-
ment is essential to sustain a cold peace, which should make pos-
sible the evolution of the conditions for a normal peace. Yet, both
the South American and the West European cases show that beyond
a certain point it is up to the regional parties, rather than to global
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powers, to move the relations to higher levels of a normal, let alone
a warm, peace.
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